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Incomplete Law
James W BowersI. INTRODUCTION

A. Codes as Signals of Willingness to Harmonize
A standard result, both of economic and political theory' and of
sociological empiricism,2 is that when groups form, insider members
desire their agents to rent seek against outsiders. Thus, when groups
led by responsive leaders interact with each other, they reach "beggarthy-neighbor" equilibria.' Rational transactors are aware of this
impulse by political groups and their governmental representatives
and when they contemplate relocating or transacting across political
boundaries, they will take measures to forestall being exploited.
Some ofthese costly precautions could be avoided ifthe jurisdictions
involved agreed to coordinate their laws governing the transactions
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
Byron R. Kantrow Professor of Law, LSU Law Center. Work on this study
was supported by a research grant from LSU Law Center Chancellor John Costonis.
I am also grateful for the comments made by the panelists at the symposium where
I presented the preliminary draft of this paper, most particularly, Alan Schwartz,
Robert Scott, and Douglas Baird. The customary disclaimer, nevertheless,
continues to apply.
1. See, e.g. Saul Levmore, InterstateExploitationandJudicialIntervention,
69 Va. L. Rev. 563 (1983); Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Between
Centralizationand Fragmentation:The Club model ofMultilateralCooperation
andProblemsofDemocraticLegitimacy, Kennedy School ofGovernment, Harvard
Univ. Working Paper No. 0 1-004, (Feb. 2001). This insight is not new.
Neighboring Nations are naturally enemies of each other, unless their
common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATIVE
REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that
neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secretjealousy which disposes
all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors.
Cf.Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 6, quoting l'Abbe de Mably, Principes
des Nggociations.
2. See, e.g. Roger Brown, Social Psychology, Part VI (2d ed. 1986)
(describing experiments in which members knowing they were assigned to groups
at random and having no other relationship with other members of the same group,
nevertheless discriminate against members of other groups whose makeup is also
known to have been randomly selected).
3. In the absence, of course, of transaction costs to the group members in
selecting and motivating their leadership. Indeed, the bright (as opposed to dark)
side of transaction costs such as agency costs, and asymmetric information leading
to moral hazard and adverse selection problems and the like, may be that they make
neighbor-beggaring arrangements more costly to organize and thus less likely than
the level of rent-seeking that might exist in their absence.
*
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in question. The history of Europe over the last 600 years, for
example, can probably be characterized by the coalescing ofpowerful
nation state groups followed by vigorous neighbor-beggaring among
them, leading to wars about every generation. In the twentieth
century, war-making technology became so destructive that the costs
ofwaging war began to greatly outweigh the potential gains from rent
seeking against foreigners. As a result, the nations ofEurope formed
a centralized bureaucracy and empowered it to outlaw a host of the
most destructive neighbor-beggaring practices, from the top down.4
The last half of the twentieth century can probably be described as the
era of such coordination.
Not only did the Europeans adopt the Rome treaty; the GATT5
and the WTO 6 were also created. NAFTA7 was enacted in the
western hemisphere. Fifty-four countries of the world harmonized
their law of sales by subscribing to the United Nations Convention on
the International Sales of Goods.' To the extent that their rentseeking impulses were not already forestalled by provisions of the
United States Constitution,9 the individual states ofthe United States
harmonized their commercial law not, like the Europeans, from the
top down, but rather by cooperative state activity, the adoption of
uniform laws from the bottom up. Of these uniform enactments, the
best known is the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). By
political reckoning, at least, the U.C.C. has been a resounding
success. It has been wholly adopted, with only minor deviations from
4. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7,1992, O.J.C. 224/1,

(1992) 1C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter "EC Treaty"], incorporating changes made by
the Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J.C. 224/1 1992, [1992] 1C.M.L.R.
719. Of course, federalizing a number of formerly competing states may simply
move the level at which the impulse to rent seek against your neighbor is exercised

from the national to federation level. See e.g. Council Directive 97/7/EEC, 1997

O.J.C. (L144/19, particularly art. 12(2) at L144/24), from the European Parliament
and Council regarding the protection of European consumers from distant sellers.
It recites the severe danger to European consumers that long distance sellers may

treat them unfairly, and then prescribes protective terms for all such distance

contracts with European consumers while, apparently, approving the exploitation
of non-European consumers by European distance sellers.

5. General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, Multilateral International Trade
inCotton Textiles, Oct. 1, 1962, 13 U.S.T 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 5240.
6. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,

KAV 4042; 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144.

7. North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 17,
1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., KAV 3417; 32 I.L.M. 289, 296 (1993) (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1994).

8. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International sale of

Goods, openedfor signature Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I at

178(1981).

9. See, e.g. City of Philadelphia v.New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S.Ct. 2531
(1978) (Laws discriminating against interstate commerce held unconstitutional.).

2002]

JAMES W BOWERS

1231

NCCUSL's' ° "Uniform" Version," in 49 of the 50 states, and
almost wholly in the 50th. 13 From an economic standpoint this
success should not be surprising, and to that extent, my colleague,
friend, and former chancellor Bill Hawkland, who was instrumental
in drafting, promulgating, and revising the code, might be credited as
a leader in sensing an historic trend in the facts of social and
transactional life-that the one market should be governed by
essentially one set of doctrines. His early work presaged a global
coordination movement in the law. No one is suggesting that the
global (or even our national) harmonization movement has increased
interjurisdictional rent seeking, or even that it failed to reduce it. 4
10. An acronym for National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. NCCUSL is a body oflawyer/commissioners appointed by the governors of
their respective states whose purpose is to draft and propose adoption of uniform
state legislation. See Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the Annual Conference Meeting in its
Ninety-Eighth Year (1994).
11. NCCUSL and the American Law Institute (ALl) jointly promulgate a sonamed "Official Text" version of the entire U.C.C. and propose it for adoption by
the various states. Most states adopt the official text nearly verbatim, but many
make minor modifications to the details. These minor nonuniformities are collected
in one volume of Hawkland's Treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code,
(Hawkland U.C.C. series local code variation, 12000).
12. Every state has adopted every article of the official text except that
Louisiana has not adopted Article 2. 2A Uniform Laws Annotated 2 (1990)
(supplementary pamphlet). Louisiana has, however, amended the sales articles of
its Civil Code to adopt close analogues of several of the sections of that article. La.
Civ. Code Book III, Title VII, Ch. 13, entitled "Sales of Movables."
13. 1A Uniform Laws Annotated, supra note 12. See also La. Civ. Code art.
2601 which enacts much of the content of U.C.C. § 2-207. There are other
analogues, e.g., between La. Civ. Code art. 2604 and U.C.C.§ 2-513; La. Civ. Code
art. 2610 and U.C.C. § 2-508; La. Civ. Code art. 2609 and U.C.C. §2-712; La. Civ.
Code art. 2611 and U.C.C. § 2-706. Although these provisions do not explicitly
enact an attempt to unify Louisiana sales law with the laws of its sister states, they
illustrate that the substance of several of Article 2's provisions were politically
attractive to contracting parties buying and selling goods in Louisiana.
14. Cf Jenna Bednar, Shirking and Stability in Federal Unions (Apr. 2001
unpublished manuscript, Univ. ofMichigan Dept. ofPolitical Science) (arguing that
under incomplete information, the equilibrium between related governments is
reached at a suboptimal level of productive contributions to the unification effort);
Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unificationand Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. Int'l Law 743 (1999) (suggesting that regulatory
competition is as likely to deliver efficient outcomes as regulatory coordination is).
Dean Robert Scott has expressed skepticism that the U.C.C. did, in fact, create
"substantive" interjurisdictional uniformity of sales law because its regulatory
provisions are so vague as to make it unknowable whether the outcomes in any sales
contract dispute in jurisdiction A will match those in jurisdiction B. Robert E.
Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do?, 52 Hastings L.J. 677 (2000) [hereinafter
"Scott, Article 2"]. Scott does not consider the commitment which the U.C.C.
means each state makes, however, to use interpretations reached by sister states as
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Particularly, Article 2 of the U.C.C., however, has been subjected to
another sort of complaint. Ironically, it was not issues of
interjurisdictional rent-seeking that motivated Article 2 so much as the
perceived inadequacy of the predecessor sales laws.
B. The Critiquefrom Technique
The founding fathers ofthe U.C.C., including Bill Hawkland whose
career we are honoring here, were persuaded that the code needed to be
enacted because the then existing commercial law, which, at least with
respect to the sales of goods, was the Uniform Sales Act, had been
extensively interpreted by various state courts to yield nonuniform
results.' 5 The resulting defect in this joint product of the uniform
legislation and common law adjudication had been the loss ofcertainty
and predictability in commercial transactions for which the commercial
law community had long hoped and dreamed. 6 The U.C.C.'s drafters
thought they knew the cause of the problem-predictability and
certainty had been lost as a cost ofusing a common law, case precedent
legal system.17 They also thought they knew the solution. Rather than
adopting a mere statute which was subject to common law court
interpretation, they would adopt a true "code." Why a code? Because
it was theorized that practice under a code employs better legal
technique. On this topic, by quoting him, Hawkland showed he feels
like most ofus do, that if Grant Gilmore said anything about a topic, he
probably said it best:
A 'code,' let us say, is a legislative enactment which entirely
pre-empts the field and which is assumed to carry within it the
answers to all possible questions: thus when a court comes to
a gap or an unforeseen situation, its duty is to find, by
extrapolationandanalogy,a solution consistent with the policy
of the codifying law; the pre-Code common law is no longer
available as an authoritative source.' (Emphasis mine).
authority in the adjudication of matters in the home state. See, e.g. Cromwell vs.
Commerce & Energy Bank, 464 So.2d 721 (La. 1985). This commitment, if
followed, sends a powerful signal that the home court will look to foreign results
rather than to home citizen advantage in applying sales law, in effect an undertaking
not to lend its own law to the rent-seeking ends of its own citizens. Accordingly,
one ought to anticipate that the legal issues which are adjudicated in American
commercial disputes will not include conflicts-of-laws questions.
15. See William D. Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Civil
Codes, 56 La. L. Rev. 231, 232-33 (1995) [hereinafter "Hawkland, UC.C."].
16. Id. at 231.
17. Id. at 233, quoting Professor Grant Gilmore's analysis.
18. Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism, Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037,
1043, (1961), [hereinafter "Gilmore, Realism"] quotedin Hawkland, U,C.C., supra
note 15, at 236.
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In the 50 years since the then young Bill Hawkland began the
successful work with his mentor, Karl Llewellyn, to draft and secure
passage of the U.C.C., the problem has finally come full circle.
Hawkland and Llewellyn believed that lack of certainty came from
the common law origins ofcommercial law. Recently, however, the
code, particularly Article 2 dealing with sales, has come under the
same criticism leveled against the pre-code commercial law by its
founders: Sales law, it is said, lacks certainty and predictability
because it is unlike the common law of service provider contracts,
which do have predictability and certainty. However, the law of sales
of goods does not have predictability and certainty because it is a
code. The diagnosis is the same, but the prescribed cures are polar
opposites. 9
This problem is not a new one. That the law is a hard place to
find definitive answers has probably perplexed lawyers and legal
scholars since the law was first invented. We know that, at least since
Blackstone, the notion that law could become certain was almost a
joke:
The uncertainty of legal proceedings is a notion so generally
adopted, and has so long been the standing theme of wit and
good humor, that he who should attempt to refute it would be
looked upon as a man, who was either incapable of
discernment himself, or else meant to impose upon others..
[This uncertainty] hath sometimes been said to owe its origin
to the number of our municipal constitutions, and the
multitude of our judicial decisions; which occasion, it is
alleged, abundance ofrules that militate and thwart with each
other, as the sentiments or caprice of successive legislatures
and judges have happened to vary.2"
Blackstone thought he understood why this unfortunate state of
affairs had arisen. It was the fault of the Normans who had spoiled
the perfect simplicity of the ancient Saxon law. "Hence the law...
which (being intended for universal reception) ought to be a plain rule
19. See Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A
Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, [hereinafter
"Scott, Uniformity Norm"] in The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and
Commercial Law (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, eds., 2000) [hereinafter "Kraus
& Walt"].

20. Sir William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 325

(1867) cited in Duncan Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone 's Commentaries, 28
Buff. L. Rev. 209, 235 (1979).
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of action, became a science of the greatest intricacy."'" Despite the
efforts of the common law courts thereafter to clean up the mess,
unfortunately parliament itselfhad continued to keep the law intricate
and uncertain. "
About a century later the law apparently began to experience
some improvement in generating easily predictable results, at least in
North America. As one professor summarized the prevailing view
toward the end of the nineteenth century
To the classical formalists, law.., meant a scientific system
of rules and institutions that were complete; in that the system
made right answers available in all cases;formalin that right
answers could be derived from the autonomous, logical
working out of the system; conceptually ordered in that
ground-level rules could all be derived from a few
fundamental principles; and socially acceptable in that the
legal system generated normative allegiance.23
Whatever relief the Langdellian formalism idea offered to lawyers
and judges suffering from Blackstonian uncertainty, it was not long
lasting. By the early part of this century, revered legal realist scholars
such as Arthur Corbin, and judges, such as Benjamin Cardozo,24 were
leading legal theory back into the swamp. 2 If it stood for little else,
the American legal realist movement convinced American legal
theorists that Doris Day had been right: "The future's not ours to see,"
including the as yet to be told story of the law and us. Legal doctrines
are not very good about letting us know what precisely will be
happening in future litigations. Latter day realists, adherents to the
critical legal studies movement, in fact, came to advocate a radical
indeterminacy thesis-that doctrines were incapable of either
predicting or justifying future legal results.26
In particular, Article 2 of the U.C.C. has been criticized for its
failure to solve the problem of contractual incompleteness. In this
study, I examine two of these critiques. I illustrate the weaknesses of
those critiques by analyzing examples of incompleteness in sales
contracts. Part II of this study addresses the argument that the U.C.C.
unwisely adopted a regulatory strategy based on general standards
21. See Kennedy, supranote 20, at 236.
22. Id. at 237.
23. Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism,66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607 (1999)
(summarizing the features of so-called Langdellian formalism).
24. Grant Gilmore, The Age of Anxiety, in The Ages of American Law (1977).
25. See Arthur Leff, Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451
(1974).
26. Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, 17-25 (1987) [hereinafter
"Kelman"].
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rather than precise rules, and that it rejected a formalist interpretive
application practice. This part also argues that the contextual, antiformalist technique adopted by the code in Article 2 was not only
correct, but also inevitable. I show that formalist statutory and
contract interpretive strategies exacerbate rather than solve the
problem of contractual incompleteness. In Part III, I apply these
arguments to two particular problems of incomplete contracts which
U.C.C. Article 2 addresses: the problem of indefinite quantity terms
and the uncertain quality specifications in certain contracts for the
sale of goods.
Part III's discussion directly addresses a second strand of criticism
ofthe code, particularly Article 2, which I denote as the distributional
dissent. Article 2's critics argue that the code is too favorable to
sellers. I illustrate the problems with this argument in the context of
incomplete contracts. In particular, there is a problem with
adequately specifying the quality ofthe goods being bought and sold.
I propose a theoretical understanding of some issues in these
indefinite quality contracts and also argue that the U.C.C.'s
incorporation doctrine mitigates the problems ofcontractual and legal
incompleteness. In the course of developing these arguments, I too
will be a critic of the code, and by implication of my colleague, one
of its principal prophets and promoters. I will also, however, be a
defender of his realist premises.
II. THE FASCINATION WITH FORMALISM AND THE CRITIQUE FROM
TECHNIQUE

In a series of articles," Dean Robert Scott has vigorously argued
for an abandonment of the jurisprudence of the U.C.C., and a return
to a formalist interpretive regime that characterized the common law
of contract prior to the adoption of the U.C.C.. The critique is
actually quite complicated. It begins with the argument that the
internal dynamics of private legislatures such as NCCUSL and ALl,
which drafted the U.C.C., are such that the rules they adopt will be
vague and indefinite,28 unless they have been captured by an interest
27. Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 N.w.

U. L. Rev. 847 (2000) [hereinafter "Scott, Formalism"]; Scott, Uniformity Norm,
supra note 19, and Scott, Article 2, supra note 14. In his contribution to this
symposium, Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2,62 La. L. Rev. 1009

(2002), [hereinafter "Scott, Rise &Fall"] he reiterates some of the arguments for
formalism in these pieces but also advocates a more moderate, nuanced approach

to the problem which he relabels as "neo-formalism."
28. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995).
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group in which case the rules will be very precise and protective of
the interests of the dominant group.2 9 Article 2, Scott claims, is guilty
of the first defect. Vague and indefinite rules, he argues, are
unsuitable for formalistic application which is necessary if true
substantive uniformity of law is ever to be achieved.30
Scott urges that the principle role of contract law is to efficiently
deal with the problem that real world contracts are incomplete. He
breaks that task into two parts: (1) correctly determining the
[incomplete] content of what the parties actually promised each other,
and (2) efficiently devising "default" clauses which fill in contractual
gaps the parties have left in their expressed contractual promises.
Since real substantive uniformity requires that the same contract
clauses be honored in the same way, both over time and as among
various jurisdictions, Scott argues strongly that the courts should
pursue the first task by confining themselves to a strictly textualist,
literal interpretation of the words used by parties in their written or
oral promises. This approach apparently exploits the value of the
dictionary, which defines words the same whenever, or wherever, one
consults it.3 ' The mistake of the code drafters, he urges, was to
29. Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1783 (1994)
[hereinafter "Scott, Politics"].
30. The vagueness of Article 2's rules gives courts discretion to reach
nonuniform results across jurisdictional boundaries. Scott,Article2, supranote 14,
at 684-85. For a fascinating explanation of what may both cause and justify
statutory uncertainty, see Joseph Grundfest & A.C. Prichard, Statutes with Multiple
Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and
Interpretation,54 Stan. L. Rev. 627 (2002):
It is entirely rational that, in the repeat game between Congress and the
courts, both branches prefer a degree ofambiguity that can sustain mixed
strategy equilibria. It follows that efforts to articulate more consistent and
precise rules for statutory construction could well be doomed to failure
whether those rules are described as textualist, intentionalist, expressive,
dynamic, or of any other form. Those rules may be doomed to fail in
practice not because they are illogical or incorrect, but because they seek
to generate a level of precision that is inconsistent with the equilibrium
relationship between the legislative and judicial branches. Put another
way, a level of ambiguity may be part of the essential fabric of our legal
regime.
Id. at 636.
31. Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note 19, at 150. At the conference, Scott
and Alan Schwartz softened this assertion, arguing that the interpretive techniques
courts should use should, themselves, be contractible. The disagreements then
seemed to focus on whether parties employing standard integration clauses in their
contracts intend those clauses to direct an interpreting court to employ a completely
noncontextual, formalist contract interpretation strategy or not. If that is what
parties intended integration clauses to accomplish but courts routinely don't regard
them as instructions to ignore contexts, one might expect contract drafters to begin
to employ interpretative direction clauses which are more explicit. The rareness of
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abandon a formalist interpretive strategy32 and to replace it with a
command to honor the contractual context in which the interpretive
task arises.33 Formalist interpretive strategies, Scott argues, are
preferable to practices which take context into account because the
decisions generated by formalist interpretation are more predictable.34
such clauses dilutes the strength of the Schwartz and Scott take on integration
clauses.
Scott is aware that the two tasks of contract law are in some degree of
tension:
Uniform interpretation argues for formalism, for a "textualist" or plainmeaning interpretation of the (facially unambiguous) express terms used
in incomplete contracts. On the other hand, the task of generating useful
defaults argues forfunctionalism,for contextualizing incomplete contracts.
The defaults will naturally come from commercial practice and context
evidence is the way courts find out about commercial practice. Thus the
first goal seems to require keeping context out as often as possible, and the
second goal seems to require incorporating context whenever possible.
Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note 19, at 150.
In his contribution to this symposium, he recharacterizes his concerns as
choosing the appropriate point on a continuum between pure textualism, and pure
contextualism. Scott, Rise & Fall,supra note 27, at 1056 fn. 144.
32. Larry Alexander offers a pithy version of our common understanding ofthe
definition of formalism:
By formalism I mean adherence to a norm's prescription without regard
to the background reasons the norm is meant to serve (even when the
norm's prescription fails to serve those background reasons in a particular
case). A Formalist looks to the form of a prescription-that it is contained
in an authoritative rule-rather than to the substantive end or ends that it
was meant to achieve. A norm is formalistic when it is opaque in the sense
that we act on it without reference to the substantive goals that underlie it.
Larry Alexander, "With me it's All er Nuthin '.: Formalismin Law and Morality,
66 U. Chi L.Rev. 530, 531 (1999).
33. See e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (2001) (policy of U.C.C. is to permit
continued expansion of commercial practice); U.C.C. § 1-205(3)-(5) (2001) (trade
usage and course of dealing shall be used in interpreting the contract); U.C.C. § 2202(a) (2001) (evidence of commercial context always admissible to explain the
terms even ofintegrated final expressions in contract language); U.C.C. §2- 208(1)
(2001) (post-contractual behavior is relevant to determining the meaning of the
contract).
34. See, Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note 19, at 152 ("Predictability of
meaning is the bedrock ofany signaling system."). Note that Scott does not address
the need, under pre-code nonharmonized law, to engage in conflicts-of-law
determinations for cross-border transactions. Anyone who can feel confident in
predicting the outcome of cases which must be determined using existing conflictsof-law doctrines has an understanding ofthat subject which is vastly different from
that ofmost observers. See George Rutherglen, InternationalShoe andthe Legacy
of Legal Realism, 2001 The Supreme Court Rev. 347 (2001). More probably,
Scott, if called upon to address the question would reply that private coordination
is cheaply available for cross-border transactors given that choice of law clauses in
contracts are routinely honored, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (2001), so that public
harmonization of law is unnecessary.
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Scott argues that contextual inquiry might have produced good
default rules,35 even at the expense of causing courts to make
mistakes in determining what the parties actually promised in their
deals, but that the potential has never been realized. Courts
adjudicating disputes under Article 2, Scott asserts, simply have
failed to develop useful contract default clauses, largely because he
is convinced that courts are incapable of any sort of decision-making
process other than to employ mechanical formalisms.36
If contracts were complete, it is the standard wisdom that there
would be no need for contract law because nobody would breach a
complete contract." The contract consists of: (1) the deficient
promises expressed by the parties, completed by (2) the default gapfilling terms of the background contract law. The express terms
alone, by hypothesis, will always be incomplete, and a formalist
application of them is the equivalent of the refusal to attempt to fill
in any gaps. A formalist interpretation strategy, then, is an
unpromising solution to the problem of contractual incompleteness.
Scott concedes that such a strategy disables courts from developing
the very default terms which might fill the gaps in the parties'
expressions and thus solve the incompleteness problem via the
development of gap-fillers.3" This is Murphy's law with a vengeance.
It is an empirical question whether traders' use of language
always conforms so tightly with the dictionary meaning so that a
rigidly formalistic interpretive technique, determining the true content
of the parties' promises from the dictionary meaning ofthe words in
their promises alone, is the strategy least likely to reach erroneous
conclusions about what they really promised each other. If languages
grow and evolve, a contract will always be expressed, and a
dictionary always written, for an obsolete version ofthe language. A
promise to deliver a two inch by four inch photographic print can
presumably be taken literally, even though we know for sure that a
promise to build using two by four framing lumber would surely, if
interpreted literally, produce a mistake.39 Scott suggests that if the
35.
36.

Scott, Article 2, supranote 14, at 686.
Scott, Formalism, supra note 27, at 861-66 (arguing that the same

transaction costs and circumstances of asymmetric information which disable
parties from writing complete express contracts likewise probably disable courts
from writing the default clauses necessary to complete them).
37. See Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note 19, at 151-52.
38. See Scott, supra note 31 and sources cited therein.
39. See specifically Stewart Macaulay, RelationalContractsFloatingon aSea
ofCustom: Thoughts about the Ideas ofIan MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 N.w.
U. L. Rev. 775, 787 (2000) (discussing the relation between nominal and real
dimensions of 2 x 4 lumber); and more generally e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, An

Afterword: Tapping the Promise of Relational Contract Theory-'Real' Legal
Language and a New Legal Realism, 94 N.w. U. L. Rev. 909, 919-25 (2000)
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law's exclusive reliance on the dictionary were perfectly known to
traders, they could use dictionary defined terms only in their
dictionary sense in their contracts, thus adapting to a formalist
regime. Then, formalism would never generate contractual error,
although the approach would likely generate fewer default terms as
well. There is a transaction cost, however, in requiring parties to
forgo the efficiency oftheir professional jargon and natural modes of
expression when they trade. It might also be true that traders are
more likely to adapt well to their own personal transactional cultures
than to an artificial context of formal law. Thus, when using the
formalist approach, traders are likely to be frequently trapped with
inaccurate dictionary definitions ofwords which they efficiently use
in all the rest of their dealings in a lexicographically deviant sense.4"
Even if Scott's empirical hunches are correct about whether
formal interpretations of contracts are the most efficient ways of
understanding what the (regrettably incompletely expressed part of
the) deal really was, there is, however, good reason to doubt whether
as an interpretative strategy in law, his insight will ever be very
relevant. Indeed the American Legal Realist movement, of which
U.C.C. Article 2 is such a prominent product,4 was based on the
discovery that claims like Scott's were, in reality, usually irrelevant.
The dream of"substantive uniformity" which Scott berates the Code
for failing to achieve is a straw man. Despite the aspirations of
drafters of comprehensive legal "Codes," completely reliable
predictions of legal outcomes were probably never possible in the
first place. Article 2, accordingly, was designed to fulfill a secondbest role, enforcing contracts only after first trying to understand what
the parties hoped to gain from them and how they expected the gains
to be achieved. This mirrors the realist faith-law can be accurately
deployed only when it is well understood.

(questioning whether accurate interpretation of the meaning of any contract
language is ever possible without having detailed information about the context in
which the parties were using it).
40. An extreme version ofthis theory is employed in Louisiana where, although
the official version of the state's Civil Code was published both in French and
English, courts have been inclined to give primacy to the French language version
on the grounds that the code had originally been written in French and the English
version was only a translation. This priority for the French language version exists,
see, e.g., Loescher v. Parr, 324 So.2d 441 (La. 1975), even though only a tiny
fraction of Louisiana's citizenry, including its legislators, judges and lawyers can
read or write in that language. Merely because Louisiana's citizens do understand
French is not, in theory, any reason why they could not, concededly at some
expense, adapt to what for many is, practically speaking, secret law.
41. See Alan Schwartz, KarlLlewellyn andthe OriginsofContract Theory, in
Kraus & Walt, supra note 19 (discussing the realist foundations of Article 2).
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A. FormalizingFormalism
Understanding the basic problem requires us to deal with the
structure of law: legalrules arefact contingent. A legislator drafting
a statute, a common law judge confecting a rule in a litigated case, or
even the writer of a contract, spelling out what the parties' rights and
responsibilities will be, must recognize that the prescriptions they are
drafting take the following form:
OL = f(a,b,c,d,e,fg)
The legal outcome [OL] is a function [f] of the values taken on by
various factual variables [a,b,c,d,e,fg]. Therefore, in a world in
which formalism was a plausible regulatory strategy, we could first
adopt the above rule. Then, whenever an occasion to apply the above
rule arose, we could program the function [f] and the facts (variable
values for [a,b,c,d,e,fg] 2) into our computer, and out would spit a
ticket with the result [OL]. Indeed, were formalism really an
efficacious legal technique, lawyers would be unnecessary.43
Computers could do the job just as well as lawyers, and would
probably be cheaper to boot." The OL formulation does not require
the rule to have been enacted by a legislature or adopted by some
other governmental law giver. The formulation could also describe
a decision rule found in a contract clause. If the contract requires in
an (a,b,c,d,e,fg) context a certain outcome, say Oc [ the Outcome of
the Contract], contract law which purports to enforce the rules that
the parties make for themselves simply recognizes that rules can
have different sources, but does not change the logic of working
with rules as sources for making decisions. Suppose we did not
have either a governmentally drafted rule [OL] or a privately drafted
contract rule [Oc] developed for a specific confluence of facts, a
circumstance we could characterize as either incomplete law or
42. I ignore for the time being, the complications introduced by the
symbolization of any "fact" as the value taken by a simple variable. Probably one
would have to identify two kinds of facts, at minimum, binary facts whose values
could be expressed as either 1 or 0 [e.g., did the seller sign anything], and
continuous facts [e.g., what was the price] which could take a number of values
needed to compute the result using the function which expresses the relationships
between the variables and the consequences of the values given them.
43. Or more accurately, lawyers would become useful only in the conduct of
proceedings intended to determine what the facts were, once the computer
determined what fact findings it was necessary to make. I have known theorists of
civil procedure and the law of evidence who probably believe that this is, in reality,
the current state of law practice, even though the rest of our curricula belies it.
44. No pun intended. For doubts that computers could ever actually develop
capability to deal with the application of legal rules see Cass Sunstein, OfArtificial
IntelligenceandLegal Reasoning,(2001 Univ. of Chi. Law School Public Law and
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 18).
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incomplete contract. In lieu thereof, we might surmise that what
people actually do tends to indicate how they think they can make
the best ofthings, and on that basis, decide to resort to some market
trade usage in search of a decision rule.45 We might discover that
parties finding themselves in contexts characterized by
[a,b,c,d,e,f,g], and only those facts, always act as if they were
acknowledging their joint desire for a distribution of entitlements
characterized as Ou, the Outcome of the Usage. A court adopting
the usage as a decision rule simply renames Ou as OL. The same
could be said for course of dealing, course of performance, and
other contextual sources for decision making rules as well. When
it comes to using the decision making rules to decide discrete cases,
the facts generating the trade practice or usage, and the outcome
described by the usage, are recast as if they were legal rules. Thus,
a formalistic approach can be taken with contextually generated
decision criteria, as well as with those framed by private contract
drafters (contract clauses), by legislators (statutes), or by judges in
appellate decisions in previous cases (common law precedent).46
B. FormalizingRealism
In practice, rules that take this logical form tend to be useless to
lawyers even when it is clear that the factual contingencies exactly
match those of the rule. When a client comes in and wants an
outcome not- 0. but describes the factual context as containing only
facts [a,b,c,d,e,fg], the lawyer who knows that the law is OL =
f(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) must advise his client he can not have what he wants,
45. Given the ubiquitousness of the prisoners' dilemma in interactive human
relationships, some might argue the contrary, that extracontractual behavior we will
observe will principally illustrate defection from cooperation. Douglas Baird et. al.,
Game Theory and the Law, 11-12 (1994). If we observe iterated behavior,
however, we can presume it is cooperative, although via the folk theorem, even if
we can say it is cooperative, we can't concluded it is optimal. Id. at 167-72. On the
other hand, if the observed behavior occurs in a market context where the parties
are making choices among many available alternatives, then we have reason to
conclude that the outcomes are likely to be more than merely jointly rational but
more likely Pareto optimal as well. Since observed behavior is not guaranteed to
be efficient, however, we might also insist on a requirement of any custom we adopt
as a decision rule, that we understand what drives the behavior, or at least that it is
unlikely to be explainable as rent-seeking. Cf Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized
Lawfor a Complex Economy: The StructuralApproach to Adjudicating the New
Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996); Eric Posner, Law,Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697 (1996).
46. These possibilities do not exhaust the potential sources for decision guiding
rules. Regulatory bureaucrats performing their rule-making functions provide
another common example. The regulations they adopt, nevertheless, will have the
same fact-contingent character as rules growing from other sources.
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and that is that. Even at $240 per hour, the legal services only
generate $4 in fees. Just as one would not anticipate breaches of
totally "complete" contracts to occur,47 legal disputes are unlikely
when the rights of all the parties are spelled out in the law in ways
that cannot be denied, i.e. when the law is totally comprehensive and
complete. Even where they are better at it than computers, lawyers
can not make much of a living passing on to their clients the easy-todetermine, already developed definite answers to all of their
problems.
The unarticulated presupposition of formalist theory is that once
we develop the answer (f) = [OL] to a legal question occurring in
environment [a,b,c,d,e,fg], we have a valuable piece of doctrine
because that environment [a,b,c,d,e,fg] can be expected to recur
again and again. Alas, however, the application of Murphy's law to
life did not end with the discovery that the problem of incomplete
contracts is almost impossible to solve.48 It also implies that once you
have a solution for any situation, you can not ever expect the situation
to recur! The fundamental, ifunarticulated, premise of formalism is
simply not valid. The central insight ofAmerican legal realism about
legal practice was that the facts of life are extremely heterogeneous.
Fees are earned not by reusing old answers to old problems to solve
new ones, but rather by coming up with new answers to questions that
have never before been asked. It follows that "substantive
uniformity," which Scott maintains is required for meaningful
uniformity to exist,49 will almost never be a concept capable of
empirical confirmation. No two jurisdictions will ever face identical
cases to decide; thus, we can never know whether anotherjurisdiction
would or would not have faithfully replicated the outcomes in a sister
jurisdiction.50
When real clients, with legal problems offering fee collection
potential in excess of $4, arrive in real law offices, their cases always
fall into one of three classes:
a. The lacuna case: [a,b,c,_, e,fg];
b. The lagniappe fact case: [a,b,c,d,e,fg, h]; or most likely,
c. The Double Whammy-lacuna andlagniappe facts: [a,b,c,
__ e,fg, hi
47. See Scott, supranote 37 and accompanying text.
48. Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigmand the Limits of Contract
Law, 3 S.Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 389 (1993).
49. Scott, Uniformity Norm, supranote 19.
50. This formulation does not imply, as Steve Harris's comment to this
symposium seems to suggest, that rules cannot generalize. Steve Harris, Rulesfor
InterpretingIncompleteContracts:A CautionaryNote, 62 La. L. Rev. 1279 (2002).
One rule can apply to several parties so long as the facts in their cases are
sufficiently close to identical.
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Recall that the legal raw materials we are given to work with in
solving these problems is a rule, one of our old friends OL/Oc/Ou =
f(a,b,c,d,e,f,g), and, perhaps, a dictionary. However, the real
problem, to be solved by real lawyers, can not ever be solved by a
simple mechanical application of any of these rules from any ofthese
sources. The problems created by contractual or legal incompleteness
are ubiquitous. The only rules judges and practitioners have to work
with do not direct us to any outcome in the case where fact "d" is not
part of the context (the incompleteness consists of the absence of a
factual predicate for the rule). Nor does the rule tell us whether and
if so, how the outcome should be affected by the presence of fact
"h," (where the incompleteness is a failure to specify whether the rule
applies in the presence of other potential contextual predicates), our
rule is particularly inadequate when our client's case differs from the
presuppositions in both respects.
Nineteenth century legal theory assumed that outcomes in specific
future cases could always be deduced from a set of grand, immutable
legal principles.5 It turned out, though, that this Langdellian view
was also premised on the unarticulated presupposition that the set of
legal problems simply recurred throughout history. Thus, the answer
worked out to the problem when it first arose (e.g., OD and could also
be implemented the second, third, and fourth times around as well.
The problem is that history does not simply consist of constantly
recurring situations. History hardly ever sends us (a,b,c,d,e,fg) again.
Instead, we always get double whammies. We keep having to work
out new solutions to new problems which always differ from the old
ones. Since rules were formulated or adopted to solve old problems,
which always differ factually in some respect from the new problems,
the rules simply do not solve the new problems automatically.
Formalist technique, when applied to solve new problems, simply
becomes fiction masquerading as deduction. 2
C. The Scope/PrecisionTrade-Off
One solution to the problem of the inevitable incompleteness of
rules which the law adopted, and for which the U.C.C. in particular
51. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1(1983).
52. This much was the now ignored message of traditional American legal
realism, and more recently the radical indeterminacy thesis of the Critical Legal
Studies movement. See Kelman, supranote 26, at 257-62. It is, however, familiar
to practitioners who rarely if ever, face opposing counsel in each case, who isn't
always able to cite some authority on behalf of his or her client. When life in the
real world always presents multiple potential authoritative answers to any problem,
and those answers always differ, the preconditions necessary to successfully employ
a formalist legal strategy simply do not obtain.
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has been specifically criticized53 is to abandon narrow rules tied to
specific facts in favor of more generalized "standards. 54 Narrow
rules have the advantage of advance precision. When the facts, and
only those facts, which drive the rules occur, the narrow rules give
clear directions and prior notice about the nature ofthe outcome. The
conventional wisdom is that because they require a lot of ex ante
specification, complete rules are expensive to formulate; thus, the
benefits of that precision must be weighed against the costs of
obtaining it.55 A popular example of a definitive rule is that if you
have not reached the minimum constitutional age to hold a particular
office, you will not be permitted to run for or to serve in that office.56
The slice of life covered by that rule, on the other.hand, is so narrow
that rarely will anybody invoke it. A thirty-four year-old presidential
aspirant will simply wait until the next election.
Because precise rules are expensive to formulate, and because
they have so little scope, one might expect to see them used mainly
to regulate common behaviors which are frequently iterated." The
basic premise of contract law, on the other hand, is that we should
enforce the heterogeneous promises of extremely heterogeneous
parties. Contract theory is justified by the improbability of precise
reiteration of real world transactions. 8 Article 2 expressly directs the
53. Scott, Article 2, supranote 14; Schwartz & Scott, supranote 28.
54. The rules/standards dichotomy was popularized by Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976). See
also Louis Kaplow, Rules vs. Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557
(1992). It has been invented several times and given differing names in the process:
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 28 (Model I/Model 2 rules); Jason Scott Johnston,
Uncertainty,Chaos, andthe Torts Process:An Economic Analysis ofLegal Form,
76 Cornell L. Rev. 341 (1991) (jurisprudence of rules/jurisprudence of balancing);
Carol M. Rose, Crystalsand Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988)
(Crystals/Mud); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis ofLegal
Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974) (specific commands/general commands).
55. Louis Kaplow, Title 9000-General Characteristics of Rules, 5
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 502, 510 (B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest eds.,
1998) [hereinafter "Kaplow"]; Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense ofthe
IncorporationStrategy, in Kraus & Walt, supra note 19 (analyzing the cost of
obtaining precision as "specification" costs).
56. U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, para. 5. Paul R. Baier, The Constitutionalityof
Minimum Age Requirments for Public Office: Reading Joseph Story on
ConstitutionDay, 60 La. L. Rev. 481 (2000).
57. "[R]ules tend to be preferable when particular activities are frequent, and
standards do best when behavior varies so greatly that any particular scenario is
relatively rare." Kaplow, supranote 55, at 510. Thus, since there are millions of
drivers, the archetypical "rule" is the highway speed limit. See, e.g. Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 28, at 604-05; Johnston, supranote 54, at 347.
58. Even when mass produced products are sold to multiple buyers, the times,
places, and features of the buyers are still quite heterogeneous, although the expense
of taking all these distinctive qualities of the situation into account in the contract
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courts to look to iterated behaviors, customs, and usages as sources
for decision rules. Ironically, however, it is this very attempt to use
iterated behavior as a source for rules, thus encouraging the use of
rules in precisely the contexts where it is most efficient to employ9
them, which is the object of complaint in the critique via technique.
Standards, in the style of my argument here, formalize as:
........
).
OL = f ,_, __,
Function (f) gives a legal command to be observed in the future, but
does not specify anything about the contexts in which the legal
command will be enforced. The factual predicates for application of
the command are determined only ex post.6" For this reason,
standards have the advantage of scope. "Be nice" and the phrase
more commonly encountered in legal prescriptions, "be reasonable,"
are commands which have potentially wide application in many of
life's arenas. Thus, the commands offer some promise to assist the
decision-making required in the future, especially in cases where
history is not simply reoccurring. The problem with standards,
however, is that although they offer a potentially wide scope of
application, they do not offer much precision. Is it just being
pleasantly friendly, and therefore "nice," to grin and wink at that
blond in the elevator lobby, or is it harassment? The standard does
not tell you ex ante, but that is when you are making the decision on
how to behave and when you need to know the answer. A rule "never
(or always) to wink at blonds in the 19th floor elevator lobby" is
superior to a "be nice" standard in influencing behavior we would
like to encourage or deter. The trouble with rules, however, is the
double whammy problem. The factual predicates, and only those
predicates, for precise application of the rule will so infrequently
recur that the rule will rarely be useful in deciding how to behave
either. What do you do, for example, when you encounter the blond
on the 18th floor, on the stairs, or in the hallway rather than in the
elevator lobby? What if she is a redhead? The value of really precise
rules formalistically applied must then be severely discounted to
reflect the improbability of their ever being directly useful in the
future. 6 Likewise, however, the value of standards must similarly be
appears to be sufficiently expensive that mass produced contracts tend to be
employed for such goods as well. Murray on Contracts § 97. The variety of mass
produced goods available everywhere is, of course, gargantuan.
59. See Scott, Formalism,supranote 27, at 854-58.
60. "[I]t is useful to define the difference between rules and standards as
involving exclusively the distinction between whether the law is given content ex
anteor expost." Kaplow, supra note 55, at 508.

61. Thus, for the legal process to create the kind of "default clauses" which can

be formalistically applied as Scott would like to see happen, wouldn't likely

produce much value. Each default clause would have such a narrow scope as to be
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discounted for the paucity of information they transmit to us about
how to behave.
The U.C.C.'s critics have developed an alternative to this tradeoff
analysis by presupposing the possibility of creating "bright line"
rules. While the logical structure of these bright line rules is never
made clear, a weak version of a "bright line" rule can probably be
restated as the proposition in my formulation that lagniappe facts will
never be regarded as relevant-(OL obtains if (a,b,c,d,e,fg) are
present or have the requisite values when computed using the
function (f) no matter what other variables may be present, and no
matterwhat values those othervariablestakeon. )62 An even stronger
version of a bright-line rule definition would be that OL = f(a)-the
outcome is a function of a single factual variable's value. Thus, the
problem of omitted or lagniappe variables never becomes relevant.
If the single variable is frequently observable, verifiable, and easy to
ascribe precise values to, the possibility' exists that a bright line rule
could have both precision and significant scope. The problem,
particularly with the strong, single variable form of a bright line rule
is with another sort of trade-off. Rules of that sort are much more
likely to produce forms of regulatory error because they are more apt
to be seriously underinclusive, thus underdeterring unfortunate
behavior, or overinclusive, thus overdeterring desirable behavior.63
Rarely can we precisely describe a normative, attractive state of
affairs as a strict function of the value of a single real world factual
variable.
D. The Imprecision ofAnalogy
Several U.C.C. scholars have accepted as jurisprudential reality
the aspirations ofKarl Llewellyn 64 and his protege Bill Hawkland that
commercial law could be governed by a "true code" in the style of the
European Civil Codes. 65 Hawkland, Llewellyn, and even apparently
Grant Gilmore66 hoped that a commercial code containing the
answers to all of life's impending questions could be drafted:
A 'code' .... is a legislative enactment which entirely preempts the field and which is assumed to carry within it the
almost valueless and thus unlikely to be worth the effort of generating the clause,
either by statute or by adoption in case law in appellate cases.
62. Cf Schwartz & Scott, supranote 28, at 604-05.
63. Cf Ehrlich, supranote 54; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 28.
64. William D. Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Civil
Codes, 56 La. L. Rev. 231 (1995).
65. William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962
U. Ill. L. F. 291 (1962).
66. Gilmore, Realism, supra note 18.
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answers to all possible questions: thus when a court comes to
a gap or an unforeseen situation, its duty is to find, by
extrapolation and analogy, a solution consistent with the
policy of the codifying law.6 7
The hope that unprovided-for cases can be resolved by
extrapolation and analogy suggests that formalism might offer some
of the unknown answers. This vision does not require that a code,
interpretedusingonlyformalisticmeans, provides the answers to all
possible questions. Professor Gilmore's vision, nevertheless, seems
to suggest that even formalistically extrapolated rules created to fill
codal gaps must still pass a test of consistency with the policies which
justify the code in the first place. Perhaps he had in mind that the
premises generating any legal gap-filling extrapolations would always
embody those same policies. Given the factually contingent nature
of legal rules, the uncertainty about what contingencies will occur in
the future, and the reality that if our prescriptions are to have scope
they will inevitably lack precision, the number of unanswered
questions will be staggering for any code. Thus, the realist message
to the creators of codes is that aspirations to be comprehensive and
preemptive are overly optimistic at the very best, and probably
foolhardy, unless coupled with an interpretive methodology which
makes the maximum use of the policy information imbedded in the
code. The technique of analogy, I will argue next, is inadequate for
that task.

Figure 1
67. Id.
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Even if bright line rules could be well-fitted enough to reality to
justify adopting them, situations can still arise in which bright line
rules cannot be easily applied using formalistic reasoning. Consider
a rule symbolized by the top box in figure 1.68 Then, consider that
three new disputes come before a court to be resolved using the rule
symbolized by that box. Each of the three "cases" has likenesses to
the "bright line" rule, but each case has its differences as well. The
triangle, like the top box rule, is constructed of straight lines although
it ultimately takes a different shape. It is like the box rule in its size,
at least in a two category size world consisting ofbig and little. The
circle also has a different shape, in that it is not constructed out of
straight lines. However, the circle is like the top box in that neither
the top box nor the circle are shaded. The big box is alike in shape,
but different in size and shading. There is no purely formal way,
however, for us to know which of the three cases the top box rule
really governs. To achieve a decision using literal, formalistic
reasoning alone, the decision maker resorting to the top box rule must
first decide whether it is size, shape, straightness of perimeter lines,
or shading that really "matters" to the box rule. Merely to ask what
qualities there are about the rule which really matter, however, is
itself to abandon formalism. The key to deciding the case is not
found in its mechanical application of likenesses. Rather, the key is
the criteria for choosing which feature really matters.69
Law is all about influencing events in the future in the directions
we want to influence the law at that time. Murphy's Law of Law,
however, holds that we can not know as much as we might like about
what the future holds, let alone know what we will want to do when
eventually we find out. Scarcity of information about what
circumstances will come to be in the future dictates that scope be
traded for precision.70 U.C.C. Article 2 purports to provide the
contract law governing the sales of all sorts of goods, from Asphalt
68. The Box Rule one can't be a single variabled bright line rule, because we
are depicting it in a two-dimensional medium. Indeed its shading adds a third
dimension, and then, when placed in the context of 3 other shapes ala the famous
Sesame Street: Some-of-these-things-belong-together, but one-isn't-the-same
framework, it becomes apparent that its relativesize adds a fourth dimension. This
illustrates, then, how hard it is to describe a normatively desirable state of affairs
in terms of only a single factual variable. A four-variable rule may be as close as
one can practically come to a "bright line." If as my reference to size as a variable
illustrates, however, that the number of variables itself is determined contextually,
the hope of creating bright line rules to avoid consideration of context becomes
completely futile.
69. Cf Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537
(1982).
70. Cf Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses 76 (1942) (arguing that all
metaphysical theories are subject to a scope vs. precision tradeoff).
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plants to pacemakers and by all sorts of heterogeneous sellers to a
multiplicity of types of buyers. Hence, it is a statute extremely
ambitious in its scope. No one should, therefore, be surprised that
Article 2 tends to use standards rather than rules, and is thus subject
to the critique that it lacks precision. 7 One should react to such a
critique in much the same way as one might to a complaint that
lunches aren't free. Life rarely permits us both to have our cake and
also to eat it. Murphy's Law of Life applies to Law, and particularly
to sales law, as well. If we want a sales law of broad scope, we
probably have to sacrifice a lot of precision in the kinds ofpredictions
we can make from our legal raw materials. Here is the trade off: do
we prefer knowing definitely what we will do about corn output
contracts entered into in 1981 in East Jesus County, but knowing next
to nothing about other kinds of contracts entered into elsewhere or do
we prefer having some guidance, but much less precision, about all
kinds ofsales of all kinds of products everywhere in the state or in the
interstate market? If, indeed, we hold the latter preference, then the
decision of the 50 states to employ a private legislature to propose the
provisions which harmonize the law governing cross-border and
intrastate transactions might have been the wise one.72
E. Variancesin Precisionas Functionsof Constraintson Source
Institutions
Indeed, one might anticipate that when rules are adopted by
legislators, they are likely to be more standard-like than rule-like.
Legislators are enacting law ex ante. A critical shortage of
trustworthy, qualified soothsayers, who can state today with certainty
what fact patterns will emerge out ofsocial life tomorrow, means that
71. Note, however, that Article 2 does direct the use of frequently iterated
behaviors as a source of rules when such iterations do occur. See text
accompanying supra notes 57and 60. Interestingly, Scott's dissatisfaction with
Article 2 is very different from his analysis of Article 9. Article 9 governs a much
more homogeneous set of constantly reiterated transactions than does Article 2.
The limit to the scope of those transactions does permit Article 9 rules to be more

precise than those inArticle 2. Scott, however, complains that this very precision
isevidence that the Article 9process had been captured by dominant interests. See
Scott, Politicssupra note 29. He does not explain why, however, the dominant

interests seem so highly motivated to secure adoption ofnarrow rules which likely
have small value due to their stipulated lack of scope. For other critiques of his
capture theory see Barry E.Adler, Limitson Politicsin Competitive CreditMarkets,
80 Va. L. Rev. 1879 (1994); Clayton P. Gillette, PoliticsandRevision:A Comment
on Scott, 80 Va. L Rev. 1853 (1994).
72. Schwartz & Scott, supranote 28, argue that private legislatures like ALl
and NCCUSL which drafted the U.C.C., are structurally biased in ways that tend to

produce standard-like law rather than rule-like law.
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legislators are required to specify desirable features about future
states of the world without very much information about the facts of
life that will obtain in that world.73 Common law appellate
adjudication, on the other hand, occurs ex post, when the future has
been allowed to fully unwind, and the facts that arose can be known.
Thus, the holdings of appellate cases seem to be narrowly fact bound
because the rules the opinion formulate are made in the context of
well-developed factual environments. Accordingly, statutes and
codes are likely to be designed to have scope while rules arising in the
common law cases can be precise.
F. Scope-CreatingFeaturesofInterpretiveMethodologies
We know from the decision in the (imaginary) case of Bank v.
Fredthat the next time a man named Fred signs a promissory note on
blue paper agreeing to repay an $1,100 loan by Friday, March 13th,
the bank can come and levy on his grand piano if he does not. What
we do not know for sure from the Freddecision, however, is what
happens for a nonrepaying debtor named Ralph who only borrowed
$800 and signed a pink note providing a due date of Thursday, March
14th, and Ralph does not own a grand piano; may the bank levy on
his golden retriever? Unfortunately for the lawyers and the judge, the
only case they will ever be responsible for is Ralph's, but the legal
raw materials they have for use in deciding the case will be rules like
the one in Fred.
Now almost any lawyer, and even law student, you may consult
would render a strong opinion that the Fredrule is likely dispostive
of Ralph's case. If it is, then the problem of incompleteness of the
law is less than I have just theorized. However, the application ofthe
Fred rule to Ralph is not possible using only formalistic logic.
Formalism, you recall, requires that we limit ourselves to absolutely
literal interpretation of the rules. We have no resort to the normative
features of the world we hope the rule will help create. Literally,
however, Fred gives us a "bank levies" outcome only for $1,100
debts due Friday, March 13th, contracted on blue notes by debtors
named Fred who own grand pianos. Extrapolating from the Fredrule
Ralph's case involves a lot more than literalism. For sure, it is not
some sort of mechanical process akin to interpolating intermediate
values between two cells in a table of logarithms.
73. This may be another explanation of why private legislatures, such as the
ALI, and NCCUSL may enact "vague" legislation, regardless of the influences of
participants with differing preferences, and incentives. The important parameter
may be that the process is ex ante and legislative, not that the particular legislative
body is public or private. Cf Schwartz & Scott, supra note 28.
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Our confidence that the rule governs comes from our sense that
the purposes the Fredrule fosters are powerful and uncontroversial.
We can not say that Fred literally is Ralph.74 We can say, on the other
hand, that we desire the kind of world which is created when law
treats everybody alike in critical ways. 75 Applying Fredto Ralph
carries out that policy. We can not say that a debt of $1,100 due on
the 13th is literally identical to a debt of $800 due on the 14th. But
we can say that the world will be a better place if the law enforces the
heterogeneous promises its inhabitants actually do make, and that
principle justifies us in ignoring the differing amounts and due dates
of the debts.76 If we passed kindergarten, we know that pink is not
literally blue either. We can say, however, that the world would
contain less welfare if we imposed needless and potentially costly
color formalities on the promise-making process. That normative
standard justifies us in disregarding the color distinctions in the two
cases. We also know that since debtors always have the power to
choose which among their various assets they wish to liquidate in
order to settle their debts. Thus, the way to induce debtors to conduct
optimal liquidations is to give the creditor the choice of which asset
to levy on when the debtor has refused to make his own choice and
has not paid.77 Accordingly, we will order a levy on a retriever on the
authority of a rule authorizing the levy on a piano.
74. Even the literal application of a rule probably requires, initially, a
characterization of the facts. The Fred/Ralph problem for example must restate the
content of fact "a" in the formula which, in Fred's case is: suppose there's a debtor
named Fred. Literally, that characterization of fact "a" distinguishes the Ralph case
completely. So, the bank's lawyers resorting to the Fred rule will restate fact "a"
as: "suppose there is a borrower-any borrower." Ifthat is the correct form for fact
"a" in the rule, then the Fred rule can apply to the Ralph case. The case begins to
turn, in this event, however, not on the logical form of the rule, literally applied, but
rather on some mysterious process under which we re-characterize the facts.
Whatever that process, however, it is not the mere mechanical application ofsome
formality. The heavy lifting done by the rule actually comes from the decision to
look at the particular trait Ralph shares with Fred (being debtors) versus both being
members of bowling teams, without articulating why we choose debt rather than
bowling-team membership as the salient trait.
75. Among other reasons for preferring this equal treatment mandate is that it
helps solve an agency problem the public might have with its decision-making
agents. Agents who harshly enforce promises against their political opponents, for
example, face the necessity under such an equal treatment regime, of treating their
political supporters with equal harshness. Since they then are partially disabled
from abusing their powers to feather their own nests, they are likely to be more
influenced by considerations of optimal harshness instead.
76. Cf Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of The Basis of Contract,89 Yale L.J. 1261 (1980).
77. James W. Bowers, Gropingand Copingin the Shadow ofMurphy's Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics ofFailure,88 Mich. L. Rev.
2097, 2113-29 (1990).
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All of this is not always obvious to lay people and even some
practitioners who would simply conclude that the factual difference
between the Fred and Ralph cases are legally "irrelevant." The
professionals may, using their learning and experience develop a
good intuition for what is relevant and what is not without ever being
able to articulate the underlying policy decisions which dictate what
becomes relevant and what does not. The more intuitively efficient
the distinction, I would speculate, the more likely a lay person would
intuit it also. Nevertheless, the point made here is that a formalist
interpretive strategy (which limits the application of the Fred rule
only to defendants named Fred and denies us the use of that rule in
cases like Ralph's) would, in fact, cause a huge quantity of
contractual or legal incompleteness, and hardly ever be a plausible
cure for either ofthem.
As the foregoing has suggested, American lawyers have probably
never been able to serve their clients , nor courts to resolve the cases
reaching them, using only formalist interpretive strategies. When
faced with an arguably governing contract clause or statutory rule, for
example Oc = OL = f(a,b,c,d,e,fg), and the predictable double
whammy case, for example [a,b,c, _, e,fg, h], courts may decide the
case and claim the result was compelled by the OL rule, not
infrequently by simply ignoring the absence of fact "d" in the case
before them even though the rule formally makes fact "d" a predicate.
Likewise, courts often ignore the existence of fact h entirely, even
though there is nothing formally in the rule which tells us that the
outcome is or is not invariant with respect to h and its value.78 Judges
who are better craftsmen might acknowledge the distinctions between
the case and the rule, but nevertheless claim that the rule compels
their decision because the absence of "d" and the presence of h do
not, for some reason, matter. Yet, the judges stop without ever
supplying that reason. The best level of judging will, however
infrequently it occurs, not only note the distinctions between the
factual predicates to the rule and the facts of the case being
adjudicated, but also defend their decision to apply the rule in spite
of those differences. Strictly speaking, however, none of the results
in the double whammy case can be justified as merely the "formal"
application ofthe rule OL. Something else besides the rule alone must
be driving the results. The presence of that something else
disqualifies the decision-making method from being described as
formalist.
It is, perhaps, even possible that judges and lawyers could
experience a direct connection between the Fredcase and Ralph's
78.

For discussion of a famous example, seetext accompanying infra notes 86,
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circumstances without ever being aware of or able to articulate that
the move from the Fred rule to the Ralph decision entails some
intermediate steps. Such leaps of intuition might even reach correct
applications of rules like the rule in the Fredcase because the lawyer
or the judge making the leap has an accurate, but subconscious, sense
of the policies that drive the rule or of the policies that are desirable
to govern the decision. Likewise, the lawyer or the judge may simply
have a good feel for how those policies generate criteria for the
making of desirable decisions. On the other hand, handing down a
decision in the Ralph case with nothing more than a cite to Fredwill
rarely provide a satisfactory explanation or justification of the
decision-making process since the formalist claim that the
connections are monotonically mechanical will not hold water
because the facts are not exactly congruent. Indeed when a decision
rule contained in a contract clause incompletely specifies the factual
context in which it was meant to apply, the clause becomes useless if
all we have for an application technique is a formalist strategy. A
rule expressed for a set of future factual contingencies can never be
formalistically applied to the future's double whammies. That is the
basic insight of American legal realism The standard technique by
which lawyers have been trained, at least since 1950, to escape from
the fiction that law can be practiced using only formalist mechanics
and to grapple with the need for law to have scope of application
enough to be practically useful, has been to accept that buried in the
automatic intuition is probably a process ofpurposeful interpretation.
When we know the purpose motivating the state to adopt a rule, we
will apply it in those factual contexts where doing so, advances that
specified purpose.79 Indeed, the fully articulated logical transit from
the Fredrule to Ralph's case presented above is an illustration of how
this technique can operate. The transaction permits us to extrapolate
from a discrete rule to a set of other general fact patterns, with greater
confidence the more identical the future operative facts are and with
an increasing loss ofcertainty the more the future facts deviate from
those in the rule's historical formulation.8" Since the purposive
interpretation strategy can produce significant scope for what are,
initially, very narrow rules, it promises some escape from the
scope/precision tradeoff constraint. Legal rules with both precision
and an interpretive strategy, which gives them scope, have significant
79. And similarly, when we know why the parties adopted a contract clause
containing a decision rule, we can apply the clause to obtain the purposes for which
the parties adopted it. Likewise if we use a custom as a decision rule, we have to
understand what drove the formation of the custom in order to use it only when that
use fosters the beneficial consequences the parties adopted the custom to achieve.
80. See, e.g. Johnston's observation that even bright line rules get fuzzy around
the edges. Johnston, supra note 54, at 345-46.
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social value because they need not be heavily discounted either for
improbability of occurrence of the circumstances in which they will
apply or emptiness ofcritical information content.
G. The Costs ofPurposiveInterpretiveStrategies
Supposing that it generates higher value rules than a formalistic
strategy, then, are there extra costs to using a purposive interpretive
strategy which outweigh the increase in the value of the decisionmaking criteria it generates? Recall that strict formalism will never
be an available option since the only cases we are ever likely to have
to deal with will be double whammies. The most obvious extra cost
might be ascribable to an enhanced risk of committing legal error
although determining a baseline strategy from which to measure the
level of error enhancement is a formidable problem. Formalism is
not an available baseline since the only cases we will ever face will
be the lacuna, lagniappe and double whammy cases.
Coming up with a reliable purpose for use as a vehicle for
extrapolating from a narrow rule to a decision in new double
whammy environment may not be easy. The resources that may need
to be expended in a search for the correct purpose, and to acquire an
adequate level of assurance that the found purpose is the correct one,
may be substantial. Empowering legal decision-makers to conduct
purposive interpretation may give rise to high agency costs and, thus,
moral hazard. The decision-maker with allowable discretion to
choose among competing potential purposes of any rule has the
power to create significant variances in the ultimate outcomes. This
discretion can possibly be exploited by the agent to act contrary to the
interests of his or her principle, the public, and instead in the interests
of himself, his circle of friends, and political supporters. The
decision making agent may shirk and, consequently, not expend the
resources required to find the correct purpose and to obtain adequate
assurance that the selected purpose is the correct one. It may also be
true that because the task is so difficult, it will be impossible to obtain
decision-making agents capable of performing it. The idea that
incompetence is a more serious problem with hard-to-do tasks than
it is with those which are easy to do clearly motivates the arguments
of the code's critics not to assign jobs like that to them."'
The contestability of assumptions about the purposes which
motivate their inclusion into the constitution has made formalism
particularly controversial as a constitutional interpretive technique.82
81. Scott, supra note 27; Eric A. Posner, A Theory of ContractLaw Under
ConditionsofRadicalJudicialError,94 N.w. U. L. Rev. 749 (2000).
82. Compare Lino A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism, It's Judicial
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Yet, when the rules being interpreted are those whose sources are in
voluntary contracts, this is not as significant a problem. Supposing that
the contract provides the way contractual gains will be split,83 it is
always in the interest of both parties to assume that their joint intent
was to exploit all the possible gains available from trade. At that level
of abstraction, knowing the purpose which motivated the rule is
probably not controversial. The trick, however, is understanding just
how a given rule tends to increase those gains. That means
understanding a lot about the economics of the businesses engaged in
the transaction and of the projects the transaction is a part of.
H. The Costs ofFormalisticInterpretationStrategies
Even if authorizing courts to pursue purposive interpretation
strategies opens a door to potential error, one would need to know if
formalistic, literalist interpretation strategies are likewise capable of
producing error as well. The issue then would become empirical:
which strategies' errors are worse? I observed above that ignoring
factual distinctions is an extreme case of rigidly formalistic decisionmaking technique.8 5 If the ignored missing or lagniappe fact ought to
have been regarded as important, then the formalistic technique is
simply a sourceof error, and not a solution to it. The potential for error
exists, however, regardless of the source of the decision-making rule.
Activism, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 293 (1996) and Raoul Berger, Constitutional
Interpretationand Activist Fantasies,82 Ky. L.J. 1(1994) with Kim I. Eisler, A
Defense ofActivism, 40 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 911 (1996) and Bernard Schwartz,
"Brennanvs. Rehnquist"-MirrorImages in ConstitutionalConstruction,19 Okla
City U. L. Rev. 213 (1994). Constitutional issues are more likely to have
widespread distributional consequences than are rules governing private exchanges,
and the lack of a generally acceptable theory of wealth redistribution probably
dooms this debate in constitutional law to a life of continuous controversy.
83. A significant literature argues that contract law fails to alter the market split
enough in favor of consumers. For a taste of this literature, a good place to start is
Linda J. Rusch, A Histoty andPerspectiveof RevisedArticle 2. The NeverEnding
Saga ofa Searchfor Balance,52 SMU L. Rev. 1683 (1999) which contains a two
page long footnote (n. 13 at 1688-89) citing twenty-eight law review articles. Most
attack the U.C.C. as insufficiently attentive to consumer concerns. Since part II
below deals explicitly with analyzing some of the stakes in the consumerist debate,
I will postpone making this qualification about the parties' potential purposes until
then.
84. This is a particularly threatening conclusion for lawyers and law students
who find comfort in the division of labor which narrows their responsibilities to
learning only the law, leaving the understanding of the business up to the client, or
perhaps employable expert witnesses. The trouble with this worldview, however,
is that it leaves nobody responsible for the connections between the law and the
business, which, if purposive application technique drives the law, is where all the
action is.
85. See text accompanying supranote 78.

1256

6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62

For a well known example, consider the case of Columbia
Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Company,86 a decision often cited as one
of the horribles resulting from Article 2's insistence that custom and
usage be considered in interpreting contracts.87 Royster, the seller,
sued Columbia, the buyer, for failing to take the minimum quantity
of phosphate stipulated under a long term supply coniract after the
market price fell below the contract price. Columbia defended by
urging that there was a usage in the fertilizer chemical trade that
minimum quantity provisions were unenforceable, and offered, as
proof of the custom, testimony of six years of sales of nitrogen by
Columbia to Royster and ofinventory exchanges between them, none
of which had hewed to the quantity terms in the many agreements.
Columbia also submitted offers of proof of testimony that because
agricultural production was so subject to quantity variances for
exogenous reasons, and fertilizer was an input to agriculture, the
custom was that all fixed quantity fertilizer contracts were in fact
understood, in the trade, as simply contracts for the supply of the
buyer's requirements.88
The issue was viewed by the Fourth Circuit as if a rule might have
developed either from this industry usage or from the course of
dealing in six years of rather informal-sounding trades of Columbia's
nitrogen surpluses to Royster in Royster's nitrogen-short months.
The court neither inquired whether a rule developed from sales of
nitrogen ought or ought not to apply to purchases of phosphate, nor
whether a rule growing from transactions which seemed mainly to
coordinate monthly outputs and sales variances properly applied to
the elaborately negotiated long term phosphate supply contract which
was executed about the time Royster made a significant investment
in new phosphate production capacity and was seeking a guaranteed
market for its new plant's output. Since the Fourth Circuit remanded
these issues to the trial court, however, one can read the opinion as
showing the Fourth Circuit believed that a formalist, literal
application of the rules it found in the context was plausible without
considering or even discussing the differences in the products being
bought or sold, or the consequences of the other differing
circumstances. In short, the Royster opinion can be criticized not
86. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
87. See, e.g., Scott, Uniformity Norm, supranote 19, at n.30.
88. Columbia's offer of proofstopped short, however, of explaining why it was
apparently optimal in the fertilizer trade for the risk of quantity uncertainty to be
placed on the manufacturers (requirements contracts sellers) rather than the
wholesalers, jobbers and distributors (requirements contracts buyers), knowledge
which would have been required by the court to accurately know when and how to
apply the customary rule in future cases. For a discussion of some potential
rationales for such contracts see text accompanying infra note 94.
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only for its failure to be formalistic regarding the literal wording of
the contract, but also for being blindly formalistic regarding the
decision rule it developed from the transaction's context. It was not
the failure to be formalistic enough with contract language that was
the possible sin in the opinion; instead, it was the strictly formalist
application ofthe decision rule which the court thought it saw in the
trade context. Formalism justifies the result as strongly as failure to
be adequately formalistic undermines it.
A purposive interpretation of the customs might have concluded
that the motivations for the monthly informalities were so vastly
different from the considerations which drove the long term supply
contract that a decision rule derived from a custom arising in the one
context was simply inappropriate to apply in the second. If I
underestimate the demand of my customers and experience a shortage
in a month where you overestimate your demaind and thus produce a
surplus, the gains from trade available by inventory swaps filling the
buyer's excess requirements in months of sellers excess output seem
apparent. Neither party assumes a risk of the other's short or long
term misestimation, but when the mis-estimations tend to cancel each
other out, the trades relieve both parties of all or a portion of the
adverse developments ofthe risks they took for that month. The long
term supply contract, on the other hand, was prompted by Royster's
multimillion dollar investment in new production capacity. It was
thus probably explainable as an attempt to share a significant risk of
longer term excess production capacity between the parties.
Application of the monthly adaptation rule to the long term deal
simply cancels the parties' risk sharing agreement and imposes all of
the shared risks back onto the seller, without explaining either why or
how sellers in those circumstances would engage in creating a rule
which would prohibit them in perpetuity from sharing long term risk.
The lesson here is that mechanical application ofrules has its own
capacity to create error which must be weighed against the dangers of
error created by application of purposive interpretation strategies.
Wooden application of rules to contexts which do not foster their
Justificatory purposes, and indeed which might even undermine them,
is a serious possible source of error for courts employing a strict
formalist application strategy, no matter whether the source of the
decision rule was a background default rule of contract law, an
express contract clause, or a contextually generated rule such as a
custom usage, or course of dealing. If, in fact, the circumstances
under which the proffered usage "rule" developed and the
circumstances that shaped it were vastly different from those that
drove the long term supply contract, then the simply-minded
mechanical application of that intentional usage rule to the latter
.negotiable long-term deal was as much an error of formalistic

1258

8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62

decision-making technique as it was an artifact of Article 2's
incorporation doctrine. Just like contract clauses, statutes and case
holdings, customary norms require purposive interpretations.
Whether Royster was a good decision or a bad one turns on whether
the rule the court applied to reach its result was explainable as a
means for increasing the contractual gains available, and, ifso, how.8 9
The decision was a failure insofar as it never sought nor developed
such a justification for the custom it used to develop its decision rule.
This failure is endemic to formalistic decision-making which is a
strategy adopted specifically to avoid the need to inquire into the
justification for decision-making criteria.
III. PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION STRATEGIES IN INCOMPLETE
CONTRACTUAL CONTEXTS

A. InterpretiveStrategiesasResponses to the Sources ofContractual
Incompleteness
The contribution of law and economics to the analysis of
commercial law has been to shed light on the probable purposes the
parties are pursing in their commercial dealings. Contracts are the
attempts traders make to align their ex ante incentives to behave in a
manner most likely to produce ex post efficient joint outcomes. The
ex ante perspective is founded on the empirical belief that parties with
correct incentives are likely to make the best available adjustments in
their behaviors to the fortuities which will arise between the time of
the contract and the time of performance. Parties with appropriate
incentives, it is believed, will make the future determinations to fill
in the gaps of their incomplete contracts by making efficient future
choices.
Scott and Schwartz have shown,9" however, that occasions will
arise in which neither legal rules nor contract clauses can be expected
to create appropriate ex ante incentives. Some future exigencies are
so remote that it will never be worthwhile for parties to bear the
expense ofcontracting over them ex ante. Some causes of contractual
incompleteness result from the unobservability or the unverifiability
of the appropriate future contingencies the parties would prefer to
contract on. Some parties will refuse to include efficient clauses in
their contracts because, merely by proposing such a clause, they risk
89. Perhaps retailers, or even the farmers themselves, rather than manufacturers
are the optimal bearers of the risks of this quantity uncertainty. Proof that the
custom assigned the risk to the optimal risk bearer is the critical element of the
custom which justifies adopting it as a decision rule in the case.
90. Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts,in Peter Newman, ed. New Palgrave
Dictionary of Law & Economics (1996); Scott, Formalism,supranote 27.
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revealing valuable private information to the other party without any
assurance of being adequately compensated. 9
In such cases,
contractual or legal incompleteness is an inevitability.
The general problem with legal incompleteness, including lack of
specificity in contracts, is that gaps in what the law or the contract
directs a party to do confer discretion on that party. When one party
has significant discretion, the other bears the risk of moral
hazard-that is the party with discretion might behave in ways which
are individually rather than collectively rational, which includes
seeking rents from his or her trading partner.92 Typically that would
involve actions which tend to shift as much of the costs of the
enterprise onto the opposite party, while shifting as much of the gains
as possible to the party having the discretion. If, for reasons of
remoteness of the contingency or informational asymmetry, the
parties cannot adopt optimal ex ante incentive alignments for
themselves, then the only option for a court is to adopt a strategy of
ex post efficient interpretation. When one party can convincingly
show ex post that it was exploited when its contract partner
succumbed to the temptation of the moral hazard and was behaving
in an opportunistic way, it is likely to resort ex post to doctrines such
as the obligation of good faith, to intervene in a way as if to enforce
an implied promise of all parties to behave in a jointly maximizing
way, and thus to resist the moral hazard incentive resulting from the
incompleteness.
91. In cases such as this it has been proposed that the legal rule should be
shaped to induce disclosure some private information. See. e.g. Ian Ayers & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 101 (1989).
92. Nevertheless the costs to the parties of specifying their expected
performance in such excruciating detail as to leave neither with any discretion is
also likely to be high. Thus parties making contracts can be expected to invest
specification costs until the marginal returns from reduction of moral hazard equal
the marginal cost of the specification. Kraus & Walt, supra note 19. Of course the
optimal direction specification may be contingent on some state of the world about
which the parties expect to be asymmetrically informed or which is difficult either
for parties to observe or verify to a court. Schwartz, supranote 28. In that case the
direction cannot be used and moral hazard must inevitably be risked by the other
party.
The "at will" employment doctrine, for example might be the law's
response to the problem the principle has in completely specifying precisely how
the agent will conduct herself in the future. Putting the agent at risk of losing
employment if the principle becomes displeased makes giving in to the temptation
provided by moral hazard extremely risky for the agent, and thus most closely
aligns the ex ante incentives of the two parties. Even were approved agent behavior
specified in advance, the principle might frequently be unable to prove that it hadn't
occurred since the most common evidence of agent shirking will be reduction in the
bottom line profitability of the joint enterprise.
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Ironically, the admonition that courts should construe contracts
with the intent to induce jointly maximizing behavior was the
invention of Dean Scott in conjunction with his long time colleague
and collaborator Charles Goetz.93 In his current work, however, Scott
notes the impossibility of ex ante interpretation for certain sources of
contractual incompleteness and dismisses the possibility that courts
are competent to police the resulting opportunism ex post. Instead,
he argues in favor of a steadfast formalist approach to the contract by
refusing to propose optimal ex ante or ex post completing terms.
This is tantamount to giving a blanket blessing to opportunism
leaving it unchecked (unless the contract was able to foresee and
regulate it explicitly, which, by hypothesis, the parties will never be
able to do.
B. Understandingthe Means ofJointMaximization, an Indefinite
Quantity ContractCase
Nevertheless, parties frequently contract with indefinite terms,
even in circumstances which do not seem to be easily explained by
asymmetric information. I turn to a typical case.
Businessmen have for centuries, been making contracts for the
sale of goods in indefinite quantities. The common law, which
valued definiteness in contracts, always had some difficulty in
enforcing some of these contracts, particularly those in which a seller
promised to sell its output of a good or a buyer promised to buy its
requirements.94 However, there might have been a good reason why
the common law was so reluctant. To the extent that variations in
quantity are potentially endogenous, when businessmen adopt
contracts of this type, they expressly contract into a regime in which
moral hazard risk is known in advance to be enhanced. Imagine a
farmer agreeing to sell his output (or his crop) of wheat to a grain
dealer. The size of this crop is partly a function of exogenous events
beyond the farmer's control, such as good weather, absence of crop
diseases and insect infestations, and the like.95 The output contract
93. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, PrinciplesofRelationalContracts,67
Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981).
94. Without a promise to have requirements or output, there was no
consideration. E.g. Bailey v. Austrian, 19 Minn. 535 (Gil. 465) (1873); Swindell
& Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 49 S.E. 673 (1905).
95. The effect of insects, disease and drought on the crops may not be utterly
beyond the farmer's control, particularly if the former are treatable with chemicals
and the latter by irrigation. The boundary between exogenous and endogenous
factors effecting the quantity of output is probably a difficult and fuzzy line to draw.
If infinite resources can solve any problem, distinguishing exogenous from
endogenous risks comes down to a determination that risks which are cheap to
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places the risk of quantity variations of this sort on the dealer. The
size of the crop, however, is also responsive to endogenous factors,
such as the farmer's skill and diligence at planting, cultivating, and
harvesting. There is also a problem with asymmetry of information
and, thus, a severe moral hazard problem in that only the farmer can
know whether the decisions about when to plant and when and how
to cultivate and harvest were likely to be jointly maximizing.96 The
dealer knows that since any increase in market value over the contract
price will not call forth extra effort from the farmer, since the gains
will all be captured by the buyer, such a contract contains known,
suboptimal incentive features.
U.C.C. Article 2-306 nevertheless makes output and requirements
contracts enforceable, thus avoiding the problems which the parties
to such contracts had in validating them at common law.97 Alan
Schwartz has suggested that Article 2 contains some provisions which
do not seem to be economically efficient because at the time it was
being drafted, game theory had yet to be invented. Hence, without any
means of determining, let alone evaluating the efficiency properties
of the probable game equilibria, the drafters were disabled from
adopting efficient provisions.98 There may be a game theoretic
outcome ofgames involving endogenously uncertain quantities which
would make validating output and requirements contracts the efficient
equilibrium. To date, however, that analysis has yet to be completed.
There was information about economic efficiency, however, available
at the time the code was being drafted which would provide a
persuasive explanation for why parties might desire to enter into
contracts which assigned discretion in ways exacerbating the moral
hazard problem.
At the time some common law courts were struggling with the
question whether to uphold such contracts, the insurance industry was
already dealing with questions of uncertainty by invoking the "law of
control are deemed endogenous, and those which are very costly will be deemed
exogenous.
96. See Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, The Natureof the Farm,41 J.L. &
Econ. 343 (1998). A standard result of economic analysis is that endogenous risks
are best assigned to the party which has control over them. See, e.g. Robert E.
Scott, Conflict and Cooperationin Long-Term Contracts,75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005
(1987).
97. "A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur
in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated
estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise
comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded." U.C.C.
§ 2-306(1) (2001).
98. Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Originsof Contract Theory, in
Kraus & Walt, supra note 19.
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large numbers." Similarly, the benefits of portfolio diversification
were known to investors. Aggregate portfolio value variances are
likely smaller than variances in the values of any of the underlying
assets or securities. Ifuncertain events occur unsystematically, then,
a risk taker assuming the entire set of risks in the aggregate, like an
insurer, can effectively price the uncertainty and bear it. This is
possible because a risk taker assuming the entirety of risks will
experience a variance in outcomes equaling only a small fraction of
the variance faced by bearers of each discrete risky eventuality, the
individual insureds. If one were to look over the parties to crop
output contracts, then, one might not be surprised to learn that the
farmer will sell his output to a single dealer, but the dealer will buy
from a multitude of farmers/sellers. To the extent that an exogenous
factor, such as timing and amount of natural rainfall, will cause a
variance in the quantity of output of any individual farmer, the
variance will tend to be offset by the opposite effects it will have on
other farmers in the group whose members contracted to sell their
outputs. Thus if Jones has a smaller crop, the shortage will, in a large
group, be potentially offset by surpluses which result on Smith's
farm. If Jones underproduces by 100 bushels, but Smith exceeds plan
by that much, the dealer's intake is unaffected by the rain pattern.
The output buyer aggregating the surpluses and shortages of multiple
output sellers, then has a comparative advantage over each individual
seller in accepting the risk of exogenously-caused quantity variations
because the risk of variance of unsystematically caused quantity
variations is lower for the aggregator than it is for any of the
individuals whose outputs are being aggregated.
By the same token, we might expect to see requirements sellers
dealing with multiple requirements buyers, when exploiting the law
of large numbers. The individual buyers may experience significant
variation in their requirements. The seller who aggregates the
variations of multiple requirements buyers can estimate more
accurately than any of them the amount he must produce to meet their
aggregated requirements. An outputs buyer or a requirements seller,
who has the best ability to plan on how much he or she must be
capable of taking or producing, can make better decisions about how
much to invest in storage or production capacity or generating resale
volume or reuse of the product than can the individual output sellers
or requirements buyers. These contracts can thus be explained now,
even absent knowledge of particular game theoretic equilibria, as
being desirable to the parties whenever the potential benefits
obtainable from exploiting the law of large numbers exceed the
foreseeable risks of being subject to moral hazard.99 The inefficiency
99. And, one might note in any scheme that so resembles insurance, the risk of
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of such contracts in moral hazard terms is traded off for gains in
certainty provided by dealing in large numbers, particularly when the
quantity altering factors are likely to have unsystematic affects.
The gains from assigning the indefinite surplus or shortages of
quantity to an output buyer or a requirements seller need not come
exclusively from the dampening affect that large numbers has on
quantity variances. Output buyers or requirements sellers may have
other competitive advantages in dealing with risks of this nature, as
compared to the outputs sellers and requirements buyers. Output
buyers or requirements sellers, for example, may have sunk the cost
of developing storage capacity or have an advantage in some other
related technology which explains why they are the most efficient
bearers of the demand or supply uncertainty risk. But skillful
lawyering requires that the court be made to understand just what
those advantages are, or to what extent they exist, if the issue
becomes, for example, whether an "unreasonably disproportionate
quantity has been either tendered or demanded."' 0 When it is large
numbers that drives the nature of the deal, on the other hand, the
quasi insurance feature of the contract would seem to dictate that no
deviations from estimates orhistorywouldbe unreasonable. It would
have been the risks of just such deviations which would have been
"insured against" and which dictated the structure of the bargain
initially. On the other hand, if it is the availability of excess storage
capacity that drove the deal, then the unreasonably disproportionate
determination ought to take into account the size of that capacity.
Parties agreeing to assume some of the moral hazard risks which
are endogenous and controlled in part by the other party may do so
because the potential gains, e.g. from dampening of variances by
dealing in large numbers, make the assumption worth it.
Nevertheless, commentators seem to agree that the requirements and
output contracts cases show an unusual sensitivity by the courts to
moral hazard risks. Courts interpret those contracts in ways which
minimize moral hazard,' 0 ' particularly when requirements buyers
increase their requirements not for unsystematic reasons; courts also
interpret those contracts to systematically exploit an advance in the
market price over the contract price. 02 Some contracts will contain
some adverse selection as well.
100. See U.C.C. § 2-306, quoted supra,note 99.
101. Stacy A. Silkworth, Quantity Variationin Open QuantityContracts,51 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 235 (1990); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract,92
Colum. L. Rev. 997 (1992); Alan Schwartz, RelationalContractsin the Courts:An
Analysis ofIncomplete Agreements andJudicialStrategies,21 J. Legal Stud. 271
(1992).
102. See, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 397
N.Y.S.2d 814 (1977); City of Lakeland, Fla. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 352 F. Supp.
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uncertain quantities without granting discretion at all, and thus do not
create moral hazard in the first place. A typical case involves
highway and heavy contracting contracts under which contractors are
paid unit prices ($X/cubic yard of soil excavated, concrete
foundations poured, etc.) rather than lump sum contract prices.
Solely in order to compare the bids of competing contractors,
however, such contracts contain "estimated" quantities. Unit prices
are bid, but the amounts paid depend on the measurement ex post of
the number of units actually excavated or supplied, irrespective ofthe
quantity estimate. Nobody knows until the hole is dug just how big
it needed to be to get down to the bedrock, nor how many yards of
concrete are required to fill it back up. The contractor agrees with the
owner to dig and refill the hole as it proves to be necessary. The
trucking firm that hauls off his excavated borrow and the concrete
supplier who sells the ready-mix to fill the hole back up are aware of
this. The contractor does not have discretion to alter the quantity,
however. Nature just does not announce the fixed quantity at the
contract stage. Critics of Article 2's incorporation doctrine prefer,
however, to read the quantity estimates in underground cases to be
promises to buy definite amounts, and approve cases, such as
Southern ConcreteServices, Inc.v. Mableton. Contractors,Inc. o3 for
requiring the contractor to take the entire estimated quantity of
concrete when the foundation, as eventually uncovered, required
much less than the "estimate". Contractors will experience individual
variances in underground conditions, but the ready-mix companies
will be dealing with multiple contractors. Thus, for the ready-mix
supplier, contractors' quantity variances will, to some extent tend to
cancel each other out. The Mableton result, which relies only on the
literal working of the contract, misunderstands why parties use such
contracts.
That the contract has an estimated quantity is
misinformation unless the contract reader understands why the
estimate is in there. Real damage is due if such a court also reads the
estimate as a promise and thus places the risk on the parties facing
discrete eventualities rather than the parties which face aggregate's
risk. The literal approach to contract quantity estimates in the face of
758 (1973). A recent analysis which argues that the good faith test was too
restrictively applied in these cases is Victor P. Goldberg, Discretionin Long-Term
Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 319
(2002) (arguing that since the contracts in question in those cases contained
discrete, identifiable limits on the possible quantity variations-they were limited
to the fuel consumable in a single power plant-that the requirements seller should
be held to have implicitly agreed to be subject to moral hazard within those limits,

because the other gains from the contract must have outweighed the moral hazard
costs).
103. 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
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these otherwise efficient appearing industry norms places the
variation risk on the parties with the comparative disadvantage in
dealing with them. Surely analysts as discerning as Bob Scott should
wonder why a contractor would, in effect, sign a take-or-pay clause
in favor of a ready-mix supplier who had not made any obvious
relation-specific investment in the supply relationship, particularly
when the seller is the usual aggregator of the quantity uncertainties
which arise in that trade.
C. The DistributionalDissentand Contractswith Incomplete
Quality Specification
The Critique from Technique, discussed above, if valid, would
apply to any standard-like law regardless of its substantive content.
The technique complaint does not criticize who will win and who will
lose under the sales of goods article of the U.C.C.,0 4 but rather
complains that the statute does not say clearly enough who the
winners and losers will be. The most passionate criticism of the
U.C.C. aims mostly at Article 2, precisely on the grounds of its
(presumably easily and accurately predictable and substantively
uniform) outcomes." 5 What is wrong with Article 2, goes this plea,
is that consumers are not likely to win a high enough portion of their
disputes with merchants. Now out in the world, there are millions of
consumers with millions of potentially differing stories to tell. There
are also legions oflaw professors who passionately believe that these
stories, collectively, describe a transactional world of extreme
injustice.

06

At the risk of drastically oversimplifying, a necessity ifthe subject
is to be addressed in a symposium article, I begin by dealing with these
complaints as a branch of the economics of contract quality. The
history of the failed attempt by a committee of academic "reformers""°7
to revise the sales of goods article of the U.C.C. (Article 2) chronicled
104. Although the chief complainant on the technique issue has also voiced his
disapproval over the substance of both the uniform laws governing Sales (Article
2) and Secured Transactions (Article 9) on the basis that they unduly disfavor
consumer transactors. Scott, Article 2, supranote 14; Scott, Politics,supra note 29.
105. In an important sense the two critiques of Article 2 which I discuss, then,
cannot be reconciled. If the results of a statutory regulation are drastically
uncertain, as critics of the first stripe insist, then a complaint that the substantive
outcomes are ideologically undesirable is at odds with the critique by claiming to
be able to see those outcomes clearly enough to evaluate their ideological
suitability. On the other hand if the statute is known to produce ideologically
unpalatable outcomes, this very certainty undercuts the complaint of the technique
critique.
106. See sources cited in supranote 84.
107. The characterization isnot mine, but Schwartz and Scott's, supra note 28.
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by the committee's reporter, Professor Richard Speidel, as a triumph
of the "strong sellers""' supports this characterization. The principle
revisions to the existing Article 2 proposed by the reformers had to do
with changes in the obligations of sellers to deliver higher quality
goods. The reformers also desired to limit the efficacy of mass
produced contracts for the sale of massed produced goods and to limit
the ability of sellers to contract out of strong quality of goods and
quality of contract obligations.
The most intuitively plausible insight of any realistic jurisprudence
has to be that reality ought to matter to the law. To understand or
justify any type of doctrine, then, one must first understand the reality
of the slice of social life to which it will arguably apply. In this part of
my study, I posit a state of social life in which a sales law normatively
and positively guaranteeing higher quality contracts and goods to
consumer buyers would be problematic. I begin my analysis with the
empirical intuition that providing extraordinarily high quality goods
using custom-crafted high quality sales contracts is likely to be
extraordinarily costly. Geometrically, one can graph unit costs,
whether marginal or average, as an increasing function of quality levels
much as one can for increases in quantity. There is a critical
difference, however, between quantity and quality. Quantity is a
potentially unlimited independent variable." Quality, on the other
hand, is potentially subject to a limit at which it exists in an absolute
form. When perfection is reached, no more increments in quality
become possible. My intuition is that as one approaches perfection, the
costs of making additional improvements to product quality increase
geometrically, asymptotic to the limit ofperfection. Graph One, below,
illustrates:

108. Richard E. Speidel, Revising UC.C.Article 2: A Viewfrom the Trenches,
52 Hastings L.J. 607 (2001); See also Rusch, supranote 84.
109. When graphed in two dimensions, the functional relationship between cost
and quantity becomes subject to limits imposed by the ceteris paribus assumption.
All inputs are fixed except the one being graphed, with the result that costs begin
increasing at asymptotic rates at high levels of the graphed input matched with fixed
low levels of all the others. The fact that few inputs are, practically speaking, ever
fixed, however, means that the limits of quantity production as a function of the cost
of the inputs will rarely be severe constraints on the decision about how much
quantity to produce, in the long run, at least.
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GRAPH ONE
INQUALITY
ASYMPTOTIC COSTOF MARGINAL INCREMENTS
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The relationship between quality level and unit cost shown by
MCQ shows how costs vary as quality is increased in increments
starting at zero quality and becoming asymptotic to the measure of
perfect quality represented by quality level P. Starting from low
levels of quality, such as level Q, on the graph, it is, accordingly,
relatively cheap to make large jumps in quality improvement at very
little increase in costs. An increase in quality from level Q, to level
Q2 can be accomplished for a relatively modest expenditure of [C2 C]. On the other hand, starting from a relatively high level of
quality, say a modest quality increase as from Q3 to Q4 can entail a
very high increase in costs, in this case of [C4 - C3]. I intuit this
relationship between costly effort and quality based on my own
personal experience. Think about the time you will spend doing the
fourth line edit of your latest manuscript, then access the increments
in quality (per unit ofediting time) you expect that edit to contribute
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to the manuscript's quality... relative to the improvements which
were available back in the first and second line edits.
Now if one is to understand the passion of the reformers for
revisions of the sales law which will require sellers to deliver higher
quality goods to consumers under higher quality sales contracts, we
might begin by reasoning that the reformers must feel current levels
of quality actually purchased by and delivered to consumers is very
low. As the graph illustrates, however, the long term, fierce
resistance of sellers to the proposed code revisions is not consistent
with an assumption like that. If the quality is already very low, huge
improvements in quality levels are possible at only the slightest
increases in sellers' costs. If additional quality, which is highly
desired by consumers, can be very cheaply supplied by sellers, it is a
mystery why consumers' demands have not been met by the
incentives provided in the market. Why should strong sellers take
expensive and lengthy measures to resist amendments to the code
which would result in, at most, modest increases in their costs for
large increases in quality levels consumers must so desperately desire
and accordingly would agree to pay handsomely to obtain? If costs
of supplying quality levels are as I posit, the impulse to increase
quality levels in the contracts themselves can most easily be met by
consumers rewarding the few high quality producers they encounter.
Competition should then prompt increases in quality levels by low
quality producers. Unless the reformers are able to articulate what
transactions costs out there inhibit the natural operation of markets
for quality, there is no apparent reason to resort to changing sales law
in order to obtain higher quality products. Even if they do have a
theory of why the market for quality fails, the reformers would also
need an explanation for why changing sales law is likely to be the
optimal strategy for obtaining higher quality goods.1 ' Until such
arguments are clearly articulated, there is little or no need to modify
the background sales law in order to induce or force market equilibria
at higher quality levels.
110. Developing a graphable measure of quality is not easy to quantify for a
manuscript, although not so difficult for many measures of quality for goods. I
would propose a measure such as decreasing number of blue marks my fastidious
senior English teacher would be tempted to make on my manuscript as such a
measure, with zero occurring at quality level P (perfection).
11. For example, the contribution of Professor Gillette to this symposium,
Clayton Gillette, Reputation andIntermediariesin Electronic Commerce, 62 La.
L. Rev. 1165 (2002), points out the availability to trading parties of nonlegal means
for adapting to the problems caused by contractual incompleteness. Ifamong them
is a problem of adquate specification of quality of the goods being sold, such a
showing ought to consider whether the option of luring sellers to develop

reputations for high quality, ala Tiffiny, is a cheaper strategy than amending the
sales laws of 50 jurisdictions.
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The contrary inference, however, is that current quality levels for
most goods being purchased and delivered are already quite high-to
the right of the "knee" of the cost curve at which quality increases
begin to become exceedingly costly. Were that the case, a reformer
might infer that sellers have the potential to make huge savings in
costs by chiseling only slightly on the level of quality they promised
to produce. The premise, however, undercuts rather than supports the
conclusion that current versions of sales law need revision in order to
assure that consumers obtain only high quality goods. The motive for
sellers to chisel on quality is not very strong unless they are already
delivering relatively high quality goods under the current law. In that
case, if the existing law already motivates sellers to supply high
quality goods, then the mystery is why would reformers want to
change the existing law as it respects the quality of goods and sales
contracts?
There is much evidence in the world that is consistent with my
hypothesis of the shape of the cost curves for supplying high quality
outputs. Anyone who has ever consulted a blueprint or a floorplan
for any kind of building can ascertain easily that the plans require
perfection in construction. The plans unambiguously show all floors
perfectly level, all walls perfectly straight and perpendicular to the
floors at every location, and all comers to be perfectly square.
The contract drawings command how the walls and floors ofthese
particular offices are to be built. If one were to interpret those
drawings literally, through the formalist lens of something like the
"four comers of the contract" doctrine so hailed by the critics of
technique,"' you would see that the plans call for those walls to be
literally straight and to be perfectly perpendicular to a perfectly and
uniformly level floor at every point. Note that the prints from which
these contract requirements can be obtained are typical of those that
one would find for any structure for which contract plans exist. In
other words, interpreted with unblinking and literal formalism," 3
every building ever built was probably constructed under a contact
that required every wall, every floor, and every ceiling to be
perfect-level, straight, plumb, and square.
In reality, however, you will find that the demands ofthe contract
are close to being Platonic forms, expressed only in terms of some
ideal. People who work in the construction trades, and those that
observe what they do and how they do it, know that none of those
buildings specified as being perfect, were ever constructed to meet the
112. See, e.g. articles cited at supranote 27.

113. The best known critic ofArticle 2's technique, has argued that the common
law which applies to construction contracts has optimally stuck with the "four
comers" rule under which all contract symbols are interpreted with utmost laterality.
Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note 19, at 168.
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literal formalist standard for quality. The plans may show the floor
to be perfectly level in every building. Nevertheless, if one were to
flood any floor of any building with a few millimeters of water, one
would find small islands a millimeter above the water level and small
ponds a millimeter deep randomly over the entire surface ofthe floor
in question. The plans show rectangular rooms with four ninety
degree comers. But if you had an expensive enough precision
protractor, and measured the comers of any room in any of the
world's perfectly specified buildings, you would find that the four
comers, while they total 360 degree are not congruent with each
other, but will vary between 88 degrees and 92 degrees depending on
how far above the floor you choose to measure the angle. Thus, the
comers come to the specified angle at that height only on the average.
The plans likewise show the walls as perfectly perpendicular to the
floor. If you were to apply precision laser measurements to them,
however, you would find that eight foot high walls might lean as
much as a quarter of an inch into or out of the room along any twenty
foot run of the wall. The plans also show that the walls are perfectly
straight from comer to comer. Yet, if you compared the walls as built
with a laser line, you would discover that all walls bulge into the
room and out of it slightly along their runs."'
Now if my empirical claim about buildings is true, one can
speculate about why perfection in construction is so rare. One
hypothesis is that every contractor who ever built a building was, in
114. How do I know this? I certainly do not claim to have seen every plan in
every contract for every building that ever had a floor or a wall. I have, however,
represented parties in construction litigation, employed experts to make
measurements of floors and walls of multiple buildings, and have talked to the
businessmen and workmen that actually have built many. What I say about all
walls, was certainly true of the small sample with which I became personally
familiar. The testimony of the men who build them, is likewise persuasive. Before
one can perform any construction operation, such as one swing of a hammer, one
would have to make a measurement, and adjust the structure to perfection prior to
the swing and then again after it. A man can make 2 accurate hammer strikes per
second on a nail or fastener if he measures and then drives the nail. One carpenter
can drive hundreds of nails per day at this rate. If he measures, makes a swing,
remeasures and recalibrates, and then takes a second swing, he is capable of driving
only a few nails a day, and even then, the wall will still wander 1/16" away from a
planned straight line along a 20' run instead of the 1/8" it will wander if constructed
without a measurement between hammer blows. Persons whosejobs involve trying
to conform to precise specifications are universally persuaded that the intuition in
graph one is correct. That I am persuaded, however, is not the point. My
hypothesis that goods and buildings never are really made to achieve perfection is
demonstrably empirically falsifiable, with enough testing resources, itcan be proved
or disproved to a high degree of generality. The suspicions of the reformers that
strong sellers always deliver lamentable quality, on the other hand is hardly discrete
enough to permit falsification.
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fact, a chiseler. He promised perfection to his customer and then did
not deliver because he was motivated, from the beginning of the
transaction to the end, to defraud every customer and to cut every
comer. Economic theory even suggests that the only rational
behavior to a contractor, after the contract is signed, is to maximally
chisel his customer. Of course the reverse is also true-the theory
predicts that every rational consumer will also chisel his contractor
once the pact is signed, by, for example, flyspecking the goods
tendered.
The other possibility, however, and I claim, the much more
credible one, is that consumers really understand that perfection is
infinitely costly and therefore, are quite understanding when the
contractor never produces it. Imperfections that it takes careful
measurements with sophisticated measuring devices to detect are
perfectly acceptable as long as they are not patent to the naked eye.
Thus, even though the plans show that construction will be perfect,
no buyer ever expects to pay an infinite sum for the structure;
accordingly, the buyer never really thinks she has contracted to buy
perfection. Contractors, similarly, do not expect consumers are
willing to pay exorbitant prices to obtain perfect qualities which are
difficult to detect; and accordingly, contractors never expect that they
are promising to sell such levels of perfection." 6 This is the
contractual significance of the fact that perfection is infinitely costly
to produce. Everyone, therefore, economically, prefers things that are
less than perfect, but "good enough." The test whether any individual
buyer, then, is being idiosyncratic when he or she demands that the
product be as perfect as the specification ought first be required to
show that an infinitely high price was promised in exchange for it.
There is much in the common law of construction contacts to
suggest that this latter possibility is the correct one. Why would the
law have abandoned the normal requirement of "perfect tender""'' 7

115. Chiseling is not rational, however, if the buyers and sellers think their
transactions will be iterated, so that present day chiseling might lead to loss of
future business. Indeed, the finding that some close knit trading communities "opt
out" of standard commercial law, Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant
Court: Rethinking the Code'sSearchfor ImmanentBusiness Norms, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1765 (1996), is consistent with the notion that a constantly reiterating
:relationship is a cure for the incompleteness of contract law.
116. The literature on contract and statutory interpretation has recently noted
1that many contracting parties are actually firms, legal fictions to which a human
:intent can be attributed only via creating a fiction. In reality, however, firms have
human substance, consisting of investors and agents. When they act, it is always
:hrough the human agency of an individual who ideally, intends to profit his
principals and forms contracts consistent with that purpose.
117. Farnsworth, Contracts § 38.12.
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and replace it with the rule of "substantial completion""' instead.
Indeed, the decision of the drafters of Article 2 to continue honoring
the perfect tender rule,'" 9but to alter it by supplying sellers an option
to cure defects, 21 can be explained as similarly motivated.
Why should this be generally the case? One might expect less
than perfect wall and floor configuration if, for example, getting the
job 99% perfect costs $1,000, and then improving from 99% to 100%
costs an additional $10,000--consequences of the fact that costs
increase asymptotically as the perfection limit is approached.
Contractors would not expect their customers to demand perfection
in the event that quality improvements become asymptotically
expensive as perfection is neared. Walls that are "good enough," but
cost only 10% of what perfect walls cost, are likely to be the wall
quality actually expected by the consumer and furnished by the
contractor, particularly when the deviation tolerances are very
difficult to detect by the naked eye.
A formalist approach to construction contracts would conclude
after carefully measuring performance in almost all buildings and
finding that in every case, the contractor was in breach of his promise
to provide perfection. In fact, however, such claims are very rare.
Perhaps parties recognize that courts would interpret the perfect
plumbness, straightness, and levelness shown on the plans in light of
the certain knowledge of all industry participants that such perfection
is not really expected by either buyers or sellers. Evidence of this
rather strong usage is standing in every building in every town. It
makes great sense to judges that imperfections occurs in construction
contract performance because idealistic quality descriptions are a
cheap way to specify in general terms what owners want built and
what contractors can feasibly build for them on limited budgets,
especially when it is well known that obtaining the ideally specified
perfection requires unlimited budgets. All knowledgeable people
dealing with such specifications understand them to be subject to
some trade customs which grant tolerances from perfection. So
powerful is the logic of this custom that it is rarely challenged. Thus,
as far as quality is concerned, it is credible to suppose that parties
confecting a common law of construction contracts are actually
employing an incorporation strategy so bemoaned for its uncertainty
by critics of the U.C.C.. When contractors generally do not build to
the perfect standard literally demanded in their contracts with buyers,
and buyers universally accept the less than perfect performances, we
can infer something else, which is even more interesting. Parties
118.

Jacobs & Young v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).

119. U.C.C. § 2-601 (2001).
120. U.C.C. § 2-508 (2001).
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actually behave in their contracts in ways which make perfect sense.
In an important way, then, the market fills in some of the incomplete
gaps in contracts. The incorporation strategy, then, is a way to
directly address the problem of contractual incompleteness by
bringing the market solution for incompleteness problems back into
the contracts the parties make for themselves.
The incorporation strategy of U.C.C. Article 2 rejects a formalist
approach for determining what the contract actually requires and
instead interprets the contract requirements in the context of the
markets where the transaction actually occurs. This means expensive
lawyering. A strictly formalist strategy would permit a lawyer to
determine the contract quality standard using only the document and
a dictionary. The incorporation strategy requires the lawyer to
actually go into the market and measure what parties are delivering
and accepting, and then to use that information to glean an
understanding of what the parties probably agreed would be the
acceptable level of product quality. Were you to talk to the workmen,
they would unvaryingly tell you they straighten and measure to a
standard where it is "good enough," not to one which literally
complies with the contract requirements. Construction contracts
frequently delegate decision-making over questions of quality
compliance to a third-party architect, professionals who are
knowledgeable about the cost to provide perfection in quality.
Specifying quality standards, in other words, is, in reality, an
expensive enterprise. The tacit understanding that the quality
specification is what the market deems "good enough," given the
limitations on the skills of the workman and the owner's budget, is an
efficient gap-filler for incomplete specification caused by the expense
of the specification.
The adoption of the "substantial completion" doctrine, together
with a damage measure which awards the buyer not the potentially
asymptotic and infinite cost of obtaining literal compliance with the
plansP2 but, rather, only the diminution in value of the structure by
reason of the claimed defect, thus triggering the buyer's duty to pay
after tender ofan imperfect performance, is understandable in a world
121. Indeed when the buyer's claim of breach is based on a failure of the goods
to be of specified quality, the shape of the curve of the cost of obtaining it provides
a good explanation for the common law's preference to award damages as the
remedy, rather than the grant of specific performance. Specific performance orders
would impose extraordinarily high costs on the seller for only minuscule gains in
quality for the buyer. Buyers however, ex post, prefer to be placed in a position to
impose exhorbitant costs onto sellers as a lever to renegotiate the original deal.
Sellers would pay a great deal to be relieved of responsibility to incur the
extraordinarily high costs, and under a regime offering specific performance, could
be forced either to incur them or buy a release from the obligation.
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with asymptotically increasing costs of providing perfect quality as
well. Indeed, the common law's preference for awarding market
damages rather than specific performance is also explainable by the
same phenomenon. Giving the buyer an entitlement to specific
performance of quality specifications in an environment of
asymptotically increasing costs becomes the right to impose
enormous costs on sellers in return for only limited increases in the
quality of the performance. Were specific performance routinely
awarded, the issue would become not how badly is the buyer injured
by the alleged quality "breach," but, rather, how big a loss can buyers
impose on sellers by forcing them to perform at exorbitant costs.
How much will you pay me not to assert my rights to specific
performance of perfect quality? By my hypothesis, most buyers
would agree to settle for cash amounting to a fraction of the seller's
cost savings in preference for having a literally perfect product
tendered to them ex post. Similarly, most would refuse to promise to
pay for perfection ex ante.
IV. ON CODES AND LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF

SOCIAL LIFE

The fathers of the U.C.C. aspired to give guidance to commercial
transactors in a wide variety of legal ventures. The realist insight can
be summarized-"guidance" is about the best a legislature or contract
drafter can practically do. Guidance, yes, but answers? You will
have to work them out for yourselves. As Bill Hawkland has argued,
this undertaking had for a precedent the existence of much more
ambitious European Civil Codes, written on the model of the French
Code Napoleon.' 22 Those codes attempt to regulate a much broader
range of behaviors than those involved in commercial transactions.
On one idealistic view, at least, the French Code Civil was also
designed to unify the preexisting heterogenous legal doctrines
prevailing in the multiple subdivisions of pre-Napoleonic France.' 23
122. Hawkland, UCC., supra note 15.
123. "[A] major purpose of codification [of the French Civil Code] was the
proclamation of a new uniform legal order to replace the vast multiplicity of local
customs." Robert A. Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 La. L. Rev. 301, 305
(1998). For a more skeptical view, which posits that upon assuming dictatorial
power in France, Napoleon chose codification in order to centralize all law to be
administered by his centralized bureaucracy, see Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer,
Legal Origins, (2001 Harvard Institute ofEconomic Research Discussion Paper No.
1920) available at http://www.post.economics.Harvard.edu/hier/2000papers/2000list.html. The insistence ofcode theorists that judges cannot be permitted to make
law, aproposition found in the Civil Code itself,see, e.g. Pascal, 59 La. L. Rev. at
307-08, is certainly evidence of a Napoleonic reluctance to grant political power to
French institutions other than his own executive. The strategy of harmonizing law
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Parties confecting border crossing transactions are likely to desire a
legal regime in which the legal outcomes are the efficient ones,
invariant to differences in the jurisdictions. 2 " The information costs
of transacting are thus reduced, and since the law is the same
everywhere in the market, only one set of laws need be assimilated by
participants in that market. Thus, harmonized law tends to reduce
costs of transacting at distances and tends to economically enlarge
markets. In enlarged markets, economies of scale can be exploited
since tremendous fixed costs can be spread over larger numbers of
consumers.
Suppose we adopt rules which are formally the same in every
jurisdiction. Unless such rules are capable ofbeing literally enforced,
the code's critics complain, the invariance proposition which justifies
the code cannot be counted on. If we cannot tell whether the buyer
or the seller will win iaw suit "X" by simply reading the statute, we
cannot count on the results to be uniform. The result would be that,
in reality, transactors will be trading in multiple markets with
differing regulations all of which must be learned by all the traders.
The benefits of the enlarged market, then, also must be forgone.
The realist insight, however, cautions against such reasoning.
Both before the U.C.C. was adopted and even today, long afterward,
whether it is the common law of England, the French Civil Code, or
the U.C.C., there probably never has been, nor will there ever be, a
test of the invariance thesis. No two cases are ever exactly alike, and
never occur at the same moment injurisdictions differing only in their
locations-the conditions necessary to test the invariance proposition.
Similar disputes take place but between different people, at different
times, and in different places. We have a pressing need to know
exactly what will happen in the future, but we live in a world
critically short of competent soothsayers who can fulfill this need.
That is the great problem of the practice of law. And yes, realists
realize, adopting the U.C.C. did not solve the problem because it
could not.
The realists recognized that the ambitions of the drafters ofcodes
could never be fulfilled. Even though believers in codes claim that
true codes are preemptive, systematic and comprehensive, containing
definite answers to all of life's persistent questions, they never really
via uniform but decentralized local adoptions, pursued by the U.C.C.'s fathers
acquits them of similar suspicions. For another view-that the mission of the
U.C.C.'s codifiers was primarily simplification rather than harmonization-see
Gilmore, Realism, supra note 18.
124. It is plausible that if traders are subjected to the laws of varying

jurisdictions at random, they would be able to diversify away the risk of dealing

with such regimes. Nevertheless, they would still have reason to prefer subjecting
their transactions to regulation only by the most efficient or those regimes.
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are, nor can they ever be. Old code answers might be answers to old
questions, but never, credibly, to new questions which have never
before been asked, and those are the only kinds of questions likely to
be brought to lawyers. Codes that resemble omnipotent gods having
all the answers, must, of course, be interpreted self-referentially.
Actually, however, adherents to code methodology do accept that
there will be incomplete law. They argue that the gaps can be filled,
however, by a proper appreciation of the ontological nature of man's
existence. Actual interpretations of the code, as a consequence,
probably owe as much to the unarticulated
religious beliefs of the
25
interpreter as they do to the dictionary.
The core message of realist teaching is that law is hard to do, and
in order to do it competently, you must first understand it and second
appreciate the reality of the actual conditions in which it will apply.
The U.C.C. does not direct the searcher for answers to its own
provisions. Instead, it explicitly tells the searcher to look out there
into the real world, and to see what is happening out there before
deciding just what you might want to do about it. This means that
much of commercial law cannot be practiced staying in a law office.
It requires lawyers to put on hard hats and go into the world where the
commerce is conducted. By the same token, however, it invites
courts to look to markets rather than dictionaries to complete
incomplete contracts. It seems highly plausible that markets are a
more fruitful place to look for such answers than dictionaries are.
The consequence to codifiers is, however, that their claims to have
regulated all of life's contingencies are finally identified as pure
pretension. Codes, whether of the European civil variety, or of the
American federal stripe, ala the Internal Revenue or the Bankruptcy
Codes, or even of cooperative enactment like the U.C.C., are
themselves incomplete. Thus, codes are in need of interpretative
techniques designed to mitigate the indecision which results from that
incompleteness.
What might we discover if we follow the code's lead and get out
and look around? Well, one thing we might find out is what the
people involved in the transaction really wanted to do, and an
understanding of why they wanted it to work that way. The immanent
125. See, e.g. Pascal, supranote 123, at 308-09 (decrying amendments to the
Louisiana civil code which secularized the basis upon which the code authorized
courts to arrive at interstitial determinations). Actually, however, there is good
reason to believe that the facts of American social life rather than the words in its
civil code have been decisive determinants of the shape of much of Louisiana's
private law, civil code legal methodology to the contrary notwithstanding. Kenneth
M. Murchison, The JudicialRevival ofLouisiana'sCivilianTradition:A Surprising
TriumphfortheAmerican Influence,49 La. L. Rev. 1(1988). Since realists believe
that the facts of social life ought to matter to the law, this is as it should be.
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law in the world, which Karl Llewellyn thought should actually shape
the law governing transactions,'26 is nothing more than a more
complete understanding of what traders really want, and why.
Knowing the why permits us to engage in the purposive interpretation
of the rules which the traders crafted in their admittedly incomplete
contracts, so as to provide the parties by our interpretation with the
legal means to achieve their actual goals. 1 7 Although the U.C.C. says
that its policies are to "clarify" the law governing commercial28
transactions and to "permit the expansion of commercial practices,"'
surely finding out what people want, understanding why it is efficient
for them, and then shaping the law to foster those ends does not
require much warping of the dictionary to fit well within those
purposes. While I have proposed here some ways to understand why
parties employ incomplete quantity terms and aspirational quality
terms in contracts, I do not suppose these understandings are
exclusive. I fully expect that were I required to inquire in much
greater detail of many serious clients in my practice about why they
do what they do, I would expect, like the realists predicted, that29 it is
the world which drives the law and not the other way around.

126. K. Llewellyan, The Common Law Tradition (1960) 122, 126-28.
127. This argument on first blush, appears to endorse an ex post efficiency
interpretive strategy. See Scott, Formalism,supra note 27, at 888-89. In fact,
however, I would advocate that the rulemaker assess whether the ex post
interpretation is likely to align well with the ex ante intentions offuture parties
whose affairs will be subject to the rule. If the ex post interpretation in case 1
doesn't create suboptimal ex ante incentives for future parties in case 2, the ex
ante/ex post viewpoint distinction doesn't bite. If it does, then the optimal rule is
to trade offex post efficiency in the rule's formulation governing case 1to amend
the rule to achieve marginal gains in improving the incentives in case 2.
128. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2001).
129. In this I follow that great realist Justice Holmes. See Grant Gilmore, The
Death of Contract 143 and n.256 (1974). "Holmes kept his own theories openended by his reiterated insistence that law basically reflects social and economic
conditions and must change as they change."

